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THEORIZING THE CHARITABLE TAX 
SUBSIDIES: THE ROLE OF DISTRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE  
MIRANDA PERRY FLEISCHER

 
ABSTRACT 
Distributive justice plays a starring role in many fundamental tax 
policy debates, from the marginal rate structure to the choice of base to 
the propriety of wealth transfer taxes. In contrast, current tax scholarship 
on the charitable tax subsidies generally either ignores or explicitly 
disavows distributive justice concerns. Instead, it focuses on the efficiency 
and pluralism-enhancing advantages of having charities provide public 
goods instead of or in addition to the government. While identifying these 
advantages is a necessary and important contribution to our 
understanding of charitable giving policy, avoidance of distributive justice 
concerns ignores the very purpose of charity: voluntary redistribution. 
After all, it’s called the charitable deduction, not the public goods 
deduction. 
As a result, the current body of work on the charitable tax subsidies is 
incomplete: it purposely under-theorizes what is “good” for society in 
order to avoid making value judgments about which projects should be 
subsidized. Although this sounds appealing, completely avoiding such 
judgments is both impossible and counterproductive. Current scholarship 
thus excessively under-theorizes the good, creating confusion about the 
charitable tax subsidies in both theory and practice.  
Explicitly addressing distributive justice—in addition to pluralism and 
efficiency—will enhance our understanding of the subsidies for three 
reasons. First, existing scholarship is incomplete and inconsistent for 
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generally ignoring distributive justice issues. It is incomplete because it 
does not adequately identify which projects deserve a subsidy; it is 
inconsistent because it implicitly contains value judgments that have 
distributive justice implications but that are unacknowledged (and often 
disavowed) by their proponents. Second, popular criticisms of the 
charitable tax subsidies raise distributive justice issues that have not been 
adequately addressed. And lastly, the law governing the charitable tax 
subsidies is itself confused on the role of distributive justice.  
Extending our understanding of the subsidies in this manner has three 
benefits. First, it will help the efficiency- and pluralism-minded scholars 
better address how to structure the tax subsidies to best promote efficiency 
and pluralism. Second, a better understanding of distributive justice will 
help us assess existing justice-related criticisms of the subsidies. And 
lastly, because our society currently spends a great deal of resources 
subsidizing charity, such a discussion will help us allocate our resources 
in a more systematic fashion. 
A cynic is a man who  
Knows the price of everything  
And the value of nothing 
—Oscar Wilde 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Distributive justice plays a starring role in many fundamental tax 
policy debates, from the marginal rate structure
1
 to the choice of base
2
 to 
the propriety of wealth transfer taxes.
3
 In contrast, most current tax 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New 
Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905 (1987); Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The 
Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952); Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper 
Moreland, Can the Graduated Income Tax Survive Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 TAX L. REV. 51 (1999). 
 2. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor 
Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1975); Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 961 (1992); Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
807 (2005); Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 
1081 (1980). 
 3. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
469 (2007); Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect From Heirs? A Proposal for a 
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scholarship on the charitable tax subsidies
4
 generally either ignores or 
explicitly disavows normative distributive justice concerns.
5
 Instead, it 
focuses on the efficiency and pluralism-enhancing advantages of having 
charities provide public goods instead of or in addition to the government.
6
 
While identifying these advantages is a necessary and important 
contribution to our understanding of charitable giving policy, avoidance of 
distributive justice concerns ignores the very purpose of charity: voluntary 
redistribution.
7
 After all, it is called the charitable deduction, not the 
public goods deduction.
8
  
 
 
Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2009); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the 
Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259 (1983); Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for 
Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994); Eric Rakowski, Transferring Wealth Liberally, 
51 TAX L. REV. 419 (1996).  
 4. The main federal subsidies include tax exemption for charitable organizations under I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) (2006), the deductions for charitable contributions under I.R.C. §§ 170, 2055, and 2522 
(2006), and the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds under I.R.C. § 145 (2006). In addition, many states 
grant charities exemption from property, income, and sales taxes; provide tort immunity; and exempt 
charitable trusts from the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
 5. For a concise and readable explanation of distributive justice, see HARRY BRIGHOUSE, 
JUSTICE (2004).  
 6. See infra Part II.B (discussing the works of, e.g., Saul Levmore, David Schizer, and Mark 
Gergen). To be clear, some valuable and important work on distributive justice and charitable giving 
does exist—just not enough such work, and not enough recent work. For example, Professor John 
Simon has very carefully and thoughtfully written about the interaction of the estate tax charitable 
deduction and egalitarian considerations. John G. Simon, Charity and Dynasty Under the Federal Tax 
System, 5 PROB. LAW 1, 30–33, 56–85 (1978). Indeed, one point of this Series is to urge others to 
follow in Simon‘s footsteps and continue this type of inquiry. In addition, a number of economists 
have attempted to assess—as a descriptive matter—the distributional impact of the charitable tax 
subsidies. See, e.g., WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992) 
[hereinafter Clotfelter] (compiling studies analyzing the beneficiaries of various categories of 
nonprofits by income). While this work is valuable, it does not address the more fundamental 
normative questions that are the domain of legal scholars: How much weight, if any, should 
policymakers give to distributive justice considerations when crafting charitable giving policy? Which 
theories of distributive justice should be given consideration? How should charity be defined to 
effectuate those considerations?  
 7. John K. McNulty, Public Policy and Private Charity: A Tax Policy Perspective, 3 VA. TAX 
REV. 229, 247–48 (1984) (―Indeed, at an elemental level redistribution seems to be what philanthropy 
is.‖); John Simon, Harvey Dale & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable 
Organizations 267, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK at 267 (Walter W. Powell & 
Richard Steinberg, eds., 2d ed. 2006) (noting that one purpose of the charitable tax subsidies is ―[t]o 
bring about . . . a degree of fairness or redistribution of resources and opportunities, or at least a 
discouragement of unacceptable forms of discrimination‖). This avoidance is all the more striking 
when one considers that distributive justice issues are an accepted part of the discourse in other areas 
of tax policy. See supra notes 1–3. Given the fact that charity has always been at least partly rooted in 
notions of redistribution, this area of tax scholarship cries out for consideration of such issues.  
 8.  Of course, the legal definition of ―charitable‖ (loosely meaning anything that benefits the 
community at large) is much broader than the popular and colloquial definition (meaning helping the 
poor). JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF 
THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 61–64 
(2005) [hereinafter HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT HEARING]. This distinction illustrates one of the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss3/2
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As a result, the current body of work on the charitable tax subsidies is 
incomplete. It purposely under-theorizes what is ―good‖ for society in 
order to avoid making value judgments about which projects should be 
subsidized. Although this sounds appealing in our diverse society, 
completely avoiding such judgments is both impossible and 
counterproductive. Most current scholarship thus excessively under-
theorizes what is considered beneficial to society, creating confusion about 
the charitable tax subsidies in both theory and practice.  
The little scholarship on the charitable tax subsidies which does 
attempt to define what is good for society also under-theorizes it. For 
example, older scholarship arguing that charity should be subsidized 
because of the various benefits it provides to society uses standards which 
are too vague to be helpful
9
 (of course, this flaw largely motivated the 
body of work seeking to avoid such standards). More recently, a few 
scholars have criticized the charitable tax subsidies by arguing that ―too 
much‖ charitable giving benefits the middle and upper classes of society 
and does ―too little‖ to help ―the poor.‖10 These criticisms are also 
incomplete, for they do not engage the fundamental questions of 
distributive justice theory: ―What should be redistributed?‖ and ―What is a 
just distribution?‖11 
Addressing distributive justice issues explicitly and more completely 
will enhance our understanding of the charitable tax subsidies on both a 
theoretical and a practical level.
12
 This is so for three reasons. First, 
 
 
mismatches between the charitable tax subsidies and the public‘s understanding of them: although the 
average layperson thinks of charity as meaning helping the poor, that is not the legal definition. Yet the 
lingering layperson conception contributes to much of the controversy surrounding the subsidies (in, 
for example, Congress and the media). Compounding this controversy is the fact that before 1959, 
Treasury and the IRS used the narrower, more colloquial definition by limiting the term ―charitable‖ to 
poor relief. Id. at 65–68. At any rate, both the history and the mismatch between the legal and popular 
sense of the term ―charitable‖ highlight the need to more explicitly address whether and how 
distributive justice should inform our understanding of the tax subsidies: just because the current 
definition ignores distributive justice issues does not answer the question whether those concerns 
should be ignored.  
 9. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 10. See infra Part III.C. Many also criticize the charitable sector for abusing its status and 
benefiting private individuals instead of the public good. This, however, is a separate question from 
whether a charity that benefits public (not private) interests is providing the ―correct‖ type of public 
benefit.  
 11. Recently, a few other scholars have begun to urge that current scholarship should pay more 
attention to such normative questions. See, e.g., Simon, et al., supra note 7, at 278 (noting that 
assessing the desirability of requiring charities to assist the poor would require a return to the 
―fundamental issues relating to the primacy of redistributional norms in American law‖); David E. 
Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 547 (2006). 
 12. I emphasize that this Article‘s goal is not to argue that distributive justice should be the only 
consideration in determining what is considered charitable. Rather, my argument is that too little 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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existing scholarship is incomplete and inconsistent: it is incomplete 
because it does not adequately identify which projects deserve a subsidy, 
and it is inconsistent because it implicitly contains value judgments that 
have distributive justice implications but that are unacknowledged (and 
often disavowed) by their proponents. Second, popular criticisms of the 
charitable tax subsidies raise distributive justice issues that have not been 
adequately addressed. And lastly, the law governing charities and exempt 
organizations is itself confused on the role of distributive justice.  
This Article is the first of a series seeking to reintroduce distributive 
justice concerns into our understanding of the charitable tax subsidies. 
This first part makes the case for considering distributive justice issues 
alongside efficiency and pluralism and quickly previews some of the 
implications of so doing. The rest of the series will analyze in more detail 
such implications, by exploring the most common accounts of distributive 
justice used by tax theorists (utilitarianism, the difference or maximin 
principle, the capabilities approach, various forms of egalitarianism, and 
libertarianism) and considering what each account adds to our 
understanding of the charitable tax subsidies.
13
 To be clear, this Series is 
not necessarily advocating narrowing the subsidies to those organizations 
that help the poor (as is often assumed when the terms ―redistribution‖ or 
―distributive justice‖ are heard).14 As those more familiar with political 
philosophy know, there are a number of strands of distributive justice, 
many of which do not involve redistribution to the less fortunate. In fact, 
one of my goals is to mine those other strands for insights into the 
charitable tax subsidies.  
Extending our understanding of the charitable tax subsidies in this 
manner has three advantages. First, a more nuanced understanding of what 
charities should do will help the efficiency- and pluralism-minded scholars 
better address how to structure the tax subsidies to best promote those 
benefits.
15
 Second, a deeper understanding of distributive justice will help 
 
 
attention is currently paid to such issues, and that considering distributive justice in addition to such 
factors as efficiency and pluralism would be beneficial. 
 13. Although the main goal of this project is to explore which types of organizations and 
transfers might be subsidized under various distributive justice approaches, the latter part of the Series 
may also analyze the intersection of distributive justice considerations and the structure of those 
subsidies (that is, whether a credit is preferable to a deduction, whether private foundations and 
§ 501(c)(4) organizations should be subject to different rules, the treatment of overseas charities, and 
similar questions).  
 14. See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 11, at 562 (conflating distributive justice with redistribution to 
the poor, which represents the maximin view of distributive justice championed by John Rawls).  
 15. A related benefit stems from the fact that the rules governing tax exemption and the 
charitable deduction have, over time, become the main regulatory regime for charitable activity more 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss3/2
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us better assess existing justice-related criticisms of the subsidies. And 
lastly, because our society currently spends a great deal of resources 
subsidizing charity, such a discussion will help us allocate our resources in 
a more systematic fashion. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief description of 
the tax benefits for charities and their theoretical justifications. Part III 
makes the case for reintroducing considerations of distributive justice into 
our thinking about the charitable tax subsidies. Part IV quickly previews 
some of the possible implications of doing so, and Part V concludes. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHARITABLE TAX BENEFITS AND THEIR 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Charities have enjoyed a special tax and legal status since biblical 
times, when Joseph exempted the land of the priests from his declaration 
that ―Pharaoh should have the fifth part‖ of the land of Egypt.16 Many 
other ancient civilizations similarly exempted religious organizations from 
tax, reasoning that such organizations belonged to the gods, far beyond the 
realm of mortals.
17
 In medieval England, churches initially were not taxed 
because they were the taxing authority, while during the time of the 
Reformation, exemption was expanded to secular charities precisely to 
undermine the power of the churches.
18
  
The 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses (which continues to influence 
much current thinking about charity) reflected this expansion.
19
 It 
conferred special benefits
20
 for a wide range of activities—including aid to 
the aged, the impotent, the poor, sick and maimed soldiers, orphans, 
prisoners, and unmarried women; schools, universities, and scholars; and 
public-works projects such as repairing bridges, causeways, and 
highways.
21
 The Statute of Charitable Uses was enacted in conjunction 
 
 
broadly. Because the subsidies are so valuable, most charitable organizations structure their activities 
so that they qualify for the subsidies. As a result, the tax rules (such as those governing lobbying, 
unrelated business activities, and private inurement) are much more important than say, state laws, in 
terms of regulating charitable activity generally. A better understanding of the tax rules applicable to 
charities can therefore yield a better understanding of the broader regulatory regime applicable to 
charities.  
 16. JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 3 (quoting 
Genesis 47:24). 
 17. Id. at 4. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. at 33–34. 
 20. For example, many of the strict conveyancing requirements applicable to private trusts were 
relaxed by the Statute of Charitable Uses. Id. at 33–36.  
 21. Id. at 34. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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with the Elizabethan Poor Laws, which placed more responsibility for 
caring for the poor on localities.
22
 Because of this tie, some scholars 
believe that a fundamental purpose of the Statute of Charitable Uses was 
to encourage private charity to the poor to help ease the burden on the 
localities.
23
 
As the American colonies were developing their tax systems, 
exemption often occurred either randomly due to the ad hoc nature of the 
tax scheme or, in the case of some churches, on the grounds that it was 
pointless for the colonies with official churches to tax an arm of their own 
government.
24
 As colonial tax systems matured, a system of exemption 
modeled on England‘s became fairly standard.25 The federal tax system 
has granted exempt status to charities since 1894,
26
 and most (if not all) 
states exempt them from the corporate income tax, state sales taxes, and 
state property taxes.
27
  
Simply because taxing income (as opposed to land or property) is a 
much more recent development in tax history,
28
 allowing individuals to 
deduct charitable contributions from their income is a more recent 
innovation than tax exemption. That said, the Internal Revenue Code has 
contained an income tax charitable deduction since 1917—only four years 
after the 16th Amendment made the income tax a permanent fixture in our 
tax system.
29
 Additionally, the Code also allows deductions for charitable 
transfers from the estate and gift tax bases.
30
  
As codified today, tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the Code and the 
ability to receive tax-deductible contributions under § 170 apply to a much 
broader range of organizations than those providing religious benefits and 
relief to the poor. Quite generally, to qualify for these benefits, an 
 
 
 22. Id. at 46, 58 n.5 (citing An Act for the Relief of the Poor, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2, reprinted in 7 
STAT. AT LARGE 30 (Eng. 1763)). 
 23. Id. at 46–47. But see James J. Fishman, Encouraging Charity in a Time of Crisis: The Poor 
Laws and the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601 28 (Dec. 14, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=868394) (arguing that the primary purpose of the Statute of 
Charitable Uses was to increase accountability by trustees of charitable assets).  
 24. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 4–5. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 5.  
 27. Id. at 20. 
 28. KLEIN, BANKMAN, SHAVIRO & STARK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 8–11 (15th ed. 2009). 
 29. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 652 
(2d ed. 2006). 
 30.  I.R.C. §§ 2055, 2522 (2006). For an exploration of which charitable contributions should be 
deductible in an ideal estate tax, see Miranda P. Fleischer, Charitable Contributions in an Ideal Estate 
Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 263, 267–68 (2007) (arguing that the social goal one uses to justify the estate tax 
determines which types of charitable contributions should be deductible).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss3/2
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organization must be formed ―for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, 
or educational purposes.‖31 ―Charitable purposes‖ has been broadly 
interpreted to include a wide variety of goals: preserving the environment, 
providing traditional legal aid as well as cause-oriented public interest 
litigation, furthering public health, supporting the arts, and so on.
32
 As a 
general rule, such organizations must provide some type of ―community 
benefit‖ in the form of fulfilling needs unmet by the private market.33 
Precisely what counts as a community benefit, however, is unclear. In 
some cases, the poor must be benefited (for example, a health club for 
middle-class people would not count but community recreation centers 
with programs for the poor do).
34
 In other cases, no benefit for the poor is 
required (for example, education, the arts, and many health services).
35
 
Most scholars agree that these tax benefits have contributed to the size 
and success of the charitable sector. As of 2004, there were over a million 
organizations qualifying for tax-exempt status as charities under 
§ 501(c)(3).
36
 These groups play an important role in our economy: in 
2001, for example, their revenues comprised almost ten percent of gross 
domestic product, and their assets measured over two trillion dollars.
37
 The 
 
 
 31. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (2006). Organizations eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions 
under I.R.C. § 170 generally are also eligible for tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) (which offers 
exemption to organizations operated for ―religious, charitable, scientific . . . literary, or educational 
purposes . . . .‖). To that end, analytical interpretations of such purposes for § 170 generally apply to 
§ 501(c)(3), and vice versa. It should be noted that a number of other kinds of organizations are tax-
exempt under § 501 but are not eligible to receive deductible contributions. Although the treatment of 
these organizations raises its own set of interesting questions, my focus is on those organizations 
eligible for both sets of subsidies—that is, those organizations considered to be ―charitable.‖ 
 32. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT HEARING, supra note 8, at 122–47; FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, 
supra note 29, at 101–47. This interpretation, which defines the purposes and activities eligible for the 
charitable tax subsidies broadly and vaguely, is long-standing. This means, of course, that any 
attempted narrowing of eligible activities based on distributive justice (or, for that matter, any other) 
concerns would disrupt the status quo and therefore likely trigger substantial political opposition. 
Although I take these political considerations seriously, I do not believe they should discourage us 
from at least thinking critically about the subsidies. It may be the case that certain organizations 
(maybe churches, for example) would continue to enjoy subsidized status due to political 
considerations no matter what. Even so, we would still get closer to resolving many of the questions 
identified in this Series by looking at distributive justice and attempting to craft tax subsidies that 
meshed with such considerations—even if such attempts are not fully achieved—than by doing 
nothing.  
 33. John D. Colombo, The Role of Access in Charitable Tax Exemption, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 343, 
345 (2004). 
 34. See Part III.D. 
 35. See id. 
 36. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT HEARING, supra note 8, at 19. This number excludes churches 
(which are not required to file returns with the IRS for First Amendment reasons) but includes private 
foundations (groups that do not conduct their own charitable activities directly, but instead make 
grants to other charities that do operate direct charitable programs). Id. 
 37. Id. at 18–20. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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sector has over ten million paid employees, representing over seven 
percent of the paid workforce.
38
 In addition, about three-quarters of 
American families make charitable donations each year, and over half of 
American families perform volunteer work of some kind.
39
 These benefits 
have not come free, however: the charitable deduction alone, for example, 
is estimated to have cost the federal fisc approximately $228 billion 
between 2005 and 2009.
40
  
Despite the large role that charities play in our society and the long 
history of these provisions, no consensus exists as to the purpose of either 
tax exemption or the charitable deduction. Some scholars believe that 
exemption is justified because it would be impossible to measure the 
income of a charity, or that the deduction is necessary to accurately 
measure the income of someone who donates to charity. Other scholars, 
however, believe that the provisions have nothing to do with measuring 
income and instead are justified only as a subsidy for charitable activity. 
These theories—and why distributive justice can help our understanding 
of them—are briefly described below.41  
A. The Measurement Theories  
One school of thought holds that exemption and deductibility are 
theoretically required as a matter of accurately measuring income in order 
to tax income.
42
 On the tax exemption side, Boris Bittker and George 
Rahdert have argued that charities should be exempt from the corporate 
income tax because it would be difficult to measure their income 
 
 
 38. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 29, at 17. 
 39. ARTHUR C. BROOKS, WHO REALLY CARES: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT 
COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM 3–4 (2006). 
 40. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT HEARING, supra note 8, at 45. 
 41. Although the subsidy theories are probably more accepted by scholars than the measurement 
theories, this Series takes no position in that debate. Rather, it takes the existence of both types of 
theories as a given and argues that distributive justice can add to our understanding of each. Moreover, 
this Series takes the very existence of the charitable tax subsidies as a given. In contrast, it may be the 
case that in ideal theory, some of the theories of distributive justice touched on herein might counsel 
against the existence of such subsidies at all. In other words, this Series works within non-ideal theory. 
For explanations of the difference between ideal and non-ideal theory, see generally JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 7–8, 215–16, 308–09 (1999); Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 
IND. L.J. 307, 309–11 (2008). In contrast, later work in this Series may explore the extent to which 
explicitly considering distributive justice issues can help us analyze the desirability of rules such as 
those differentiating public charities and private foundations, the prohibitions against lobbying and 
political activities, the private benefit rule, and the unrelated business income tax.  
 42. In contrast, to my knowledge, nobody has attempted to explain the ability to issue tax-exempt 
bonds in measurement terms. In other words, scholars appear to agree that that facet of non-profit 
taxation can be justified only on subsidy grounds. 
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satisfactorily
43
 (in contrast to a for-profit corporation, where taxable 
income roughly equals gross income from investments or sales of goods or 
services less the costs of earning that income). As an initial matter, should 
the charity be considered a non-taxable conduit between donors and 
recipients? Or should the charity be considered taxable itself? If so, how 
should its income be measured? Should donations to the group be 
considered income of the charity? How should dues from members be 
treated? Should expenditures for the group‘s designated purpose (say, 
meals provided to the poor) be considered deductible expenses, or are they 
nondeductible gifts? What tax rate should apply—the corporate rate, or the 
varying rates of all the individual beneficiaries of the charity?
44
  
This focus on measuring income is mirrored on the deduction side by 
William Andrews, who proposed that a deduction for charitable transfers 
is necessary to measure personal income accurately.
45
 This theory starts 
from the Haig-Simons definition of the ideal income tax base as 
accumulation plus consumption,
46
 and argues that charitable expenditures 
should be excluded when determining an individual‘s consumption (and 
therefore income) for the year.
47
 Andrews first explained that for tax 
purposes, ―consumption‖ should include only the ―private consumption of 
divisible goods and services whose consumption by one household 
precludes their direct enjoyment by others.‖48 He then reasoned that in 
contrast, charitable contributions divert resources away from private use 
and toward common goods that can be enjoyed regardless of one‘s 
contribution.
49
  
Andrews noted as examples that  
a wealthy man cannot purchase and enjoy the sound of a new 
church organ without conferring a benefit on his fellow parishioners 
. . . . 
 
 
 43. Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from 
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 307–14 (1976); see also Henry B. Hansmann, The 
Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 
59–62 (1981) (offering a thoughtful critique of this theory). 
 44. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 43, at 307–16. 
 45. See William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
309, 314–15 (1972). For an analysis of whether a similar argument might apply to the estate tax 
charitable deduction, see Fleischer, supra note 30, at 267–68. 
 46. Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE 
DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938).  
 47. Andrews, supra note 45, at 344–75.  
 48. Id. at 346. 
 49. Id. 
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 . . . [and] [a]ttendance at church on a particular Sunday, use of 
the town library, or listening to a symphony orchestra broadcast will 
not immediately prevent someone else from doing the same thing.
50
  
Under this reasoning, since a charitable donor must necessarily share with 
others any benefit she receives, charitable contributions should not count 
as consumption.
51
 In other words, such expenditures should be excluded 
from the ideal income tax base.
52
  
Although Andrews has drawn his share of criticism,
53
 he is not the only 
scholar to advance tax-base theories for the deduction.
54
 Writing at about 
the same time as Andrews, Boris Bittker similarly proposed that charitable 
donations should not be considered consumption because they ―discharge 
[a] moral obligation.‖55 More recently, Johnny Rex Buckles has argued 
that individuals should be allowed to deduct charitable contributions since 
assets donated to charity should more properly be considered ―community 
income‖ and that the community itself should be exempt from income.56 
And although not couched as such, Evelyn Brody also proposes a theory 
that in many respects reflects tax-base ideals:
57
 she has suggested that the 
 
 
 50. Id. at 357–58. 
 51. Id. at 346. 
 52. Id. at 314–17. As Mark Gergen has pointed out, the characteristics that Andrews argues 
preclude these expenditures from being personal consumption are the same characteristics that define 
public goods. Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 
1393, 1397, 1416 (1988).  
 53. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 52, at 1397, 1416 (re-characterizing Andrews‘s thesis as simply 
another argument for subsidizing public goods); Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions 
in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 345, 375–77 (1989) (criticizing Andrews for lacking a 
―coherent normative principle‖); Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit 
Poorly in an “Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. 
REV. 831, 849–51 (1979) (criticizing Andrews‘s contention that charitable giving is not consumption 
in part because donors receive deference, respect, and attention); Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal 
Deductions Under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX L. REV. 679, 707 (1988) (conceptualizing an ideal 
income tax as taxing the power to consume and concluding that spending cash or property on 
charitable purposes ―represents a clear personal benefit to the donor‖). 
 54. Writing soon after Andrews, John Simon offered a similar rationale for the estate tax 
charitable deduction. See Simon, supra note 6, at 23. 
 55. Boris Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L. 
REV. 37, 58–59 (1972). 
 56. Johnny Rex Buckles, The Community Income Theory of the Charitable Contributions 
Deduction, 80 IND. L.J. 947, 952 (2005). 
 57. See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 
23 J. CORP. L. 585, 586 (1998). In fact, Brody specifically argues that the sovereignty approach 
explains the current legal landscape for charities better than either the base-measurement or subsidy 
approach. I have included her argument here, however, because I believe that her argument has more 
in common with tax-base arguments than subsidy arguments: to me, arguing that a given sector is not 
an appropriate base for taxation, much like other countries are not appropriate targets of taxation, is 
closer to a measurement theory about what can and cannot be taxed than it is to a subsidy theory about 
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current tax status of charities (including both the deduction and tax 
exemption) is best explained by conceiving of the charitable world as its 
own sovereign sector, receiving the same federal tax treatment as other 
sovereigns such as foreign, state, and local governments.
58
 
B. The Subsidy Theories 
The more common view,
59
 however, is that the income of charities 
could be measured as a technical matter,
60
 and that an individual‘s 
charitable donations should constitute consumption (and therefore be 
taxed) in a pure Haig-Simons world.
61
 Under this view, tax exemption, the 
charitable deduction, and the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds are 
justifiable as tax expenditures to subsidize charity generally.
62
  
 
 
what should or should not be taxed in order to encourage certain behavior. In some respects, however, 
the dilemma over which type of theory Brody‘s is closest to represents the fact that at the end of the 
day, the subsidy and measurement theories may not be that far apart after all. See, e.g., Gergen, supra 
note 52, at 1416.  
 58. Brody, supra note 57, at 587. That said, Brody also argues that the sovereignty approach 
should not guide lawmakers going forward. In other words, her point is a descriptive argument, not a 
normative one. 
 59. Pozen, supra note 11, at 552–53 (―In Congress, the courts, the media, and now academia, the 
deduction is widely viewed not as a means to reify the ideal tax base . . . but as a tax expenditure used 
to promote charitable giving and thereby the ultimate well-being of society. That is, the deduction is 
widely viewed as a government subsidy . . . .‖). 
 60. For a detailed critique of Bittker and Rahdert‘s base-measurement theory for exemption, see 
Hansmann, supra note 43, at 59–62. 
 61. See supra note 46. 
 62. The deduction is thought to subsidize charity in the following manner. Imagine a taxpayer in 
the 35% bracket who donates $100 to charity and receives a $100 deduction. This deduction reduces 
her tax bill by $35, meaning that she has transferred $100 to charity at a net cost to her of $65. The 
government has subsidized her transfer to the tune of $35. By lowering the price of making charitable 
gifts, the subsidy is thought to increase taxpayers‘ incentives to make them. This increased giving in 
turn enhances the scope and activity of the charitable sector. Tax exemption likewise subsidizes 
charity by providing charities with more funds to operate their programs than in a world where they 
pay tax. Imagine a charity that had net revenues in a given year of $100,000, after expenses for that 
year‘s activities. If the charity had to pay tax, it would only have $65,000 left (assuming charities 
would be subject to the 35% corporate rate) to use for more charitable activities the next year. Free of 
tax, however, the charity has the full $100,000. In other words, the tax revenue not collected from the 
charity is equal to its subsidy. Lastly, the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds subsidizes charities because 
it allows them to issue bonds with lower rates of returns than their taxable counterparts. Imagine, for 
example, that the average pre-tax rate of return is 10%. An investor in the 35% bracket, however, 
would receive a post-tax rate of return of only 6.5%. That investor, therefore, should be indifferent 
between a taxable bond with a return of 10% and a bond yielding tax-exempt interest of only 6.5%. 
While the extent to which tax-exempt bonds fully capitalize this difference is open to debate, Boris I. 
Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?, 16 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 735, 738–42 (1979), few dispute that non-profits are able to issue bonds with lower 
rates than they otherwise could. This ability to borrow money more cheaply constitutes a subsidy. 
Interestingly, the tax expenditure budget list includes the deduction and tax-exempt bonds, but not tax 
exemption (despite the scholarly consensus that exemption is also a subsidy). STAFF OF JOINT COMM. 
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1. The Building Blocks: Why Subsidize Charity?  
A variety of arguments abound as to why charity should be subsidized. 
The traditional explanation is that subsidizing charities is ―good‖ because 
of the benefits charities provide.
63
 Some such theories focus on the fact 
that charities relieve the government of burdens it would otherwise have to 
bear (for example, poverty relief).
64
 Others emphasize the role that 
charities play in providing creative and diverse solutions to society‘s 
problems, in offering alternative viewpoints in the arts and culture, and in 
countering governmental power and enhancing pluralism and 
experimentation.
65
 Lastly, Rob Atkinson has argued that charitable groups 
should be subsidized because the ―altruistic provision of . . . good[s] and 
service[s] [is] inherently desirable . . . .‖66  
Because these traditional subsidy rationales rest on a normative 
assessment of the ―goodness‖ of charities‘ activities, they necessarily 
entail value-based judgments about which activities merit a subsidy. In 
contrast, most recent scholarship displays a reluctance to engage in 
normative assessments of the value of various activities.
67
 Instead, the 
 
 
ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., REPORT ON ESTIMATES FOR FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL 
YEARS 2008–2012 (Comm. Print. 2008). 
 63. For a typical example of how courts invoke the traditional subsidy argument, see Green v. 
Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971). 
 64. See, e.g., COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 45 (discussing and critiquing); Bittker, supra 
note 55, at 39; Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable 
Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 430–31 n.34 (1998) (citing H.R. 
REP. NO. 75, at 19 (1938)); Hansmann, supra note 43, at 66; Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching 
Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377, 
390 (1972). It should be noted that I.R.C. § 170(c)(1) provides a charitable contribution deduction for 
contributions to states and localities, a result that mirrors the deduction for state and local taxes. For 
purposes of this Series, however, I take such rules as a given; my focus is on the tax treatment of 
organizations other than governments and contributions thereto. 
 65. See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 605 n.291 
(1990); Bittker, supra note 55, at 39; McDaniel, supra note 64, at 390–91; Simon, supra note 6, at 68–
69. In a similar vein, David Brennen has recently argued that the value of diversity justifies the 
charitable tax exemption and that normatively, diversity requires a consideration of both public and 
private interests (such as the type of consideration offered by critical race theory) to determine the 
scope and contours of the charitable tax subsidies. David A. Brennen, A Diversity Theory of 
Charitable Tax Exemption—Beyond Efficiency, Through Critical Race Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 
PITT. TAX REV. 1 (2006).  
 66. Atkinson, supra note 65, at 635. To Atkinson, the mere fact that a donor is subsidizing 
another‘s consumption is enough to trigger a subsidy for the organization in the form of tax exemption. 
See generally id. 
 67. In addition to the economic arguments explored in this part, the measurement theories 
outlined in the prior part also arose from a desire to avoid value-based judgments. As explained infra 
Part III.A.2, this reluctance usually stems from either (1) suspicion that the current tax subsidies 
cannot be descriptively justified on the basis of such normative assessments, (2) the avoidance of 
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newer (and probably more accepted) explanations for subsidizing charity 
seek to avoid these value-based judgments.
68
 These theories are grounded 
in economics: quite generally, they theorize that subsidizing charities is 
necessary to assist them to provide goods or services that would otherwise 
be under-produced due to various market and governmental failures.
69
  
Henry Hansmann was among the first to articulate such an economic 
subsidy-based argument for tax exemption,
70
 building upon his prior work 
on the non-distribution constraint.
71
 In his seminal piece on tax exemption, 
Hansmann recognized that while the non-distribution constraint protected 
consumers in transactions susceptible to contract failure, it simultaneously 
undermined the ability of non-profit firms to raise capital and obtain 
loans.
72
 Exemption, he argued, helped non-profit firms overcome this 
 
 
substantive normative judgments that is associated with traditional law and economics, or (3) a belief 
that avoiding such judgments furthers pluralism or better reflects citizens‘ preferences.  
 68. As argued infra in the text accompanying notes 196–226, however, these analyses implicitly 
contain their own set of value judgments. 
 69. See, e.g., COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 100–08 (discussing the underlying economics 
of the donative theory); Gergen, supra note 52, at 1396–1406; Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory 
of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT 
INSTITUTIONS 21 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986). 
 70. Hansmann, supra note 43, at 54. Professor Hansmann‘s article addressed only tax exemption, 
and, in fact, he specifically distinguished the issues raised by the charitable deduction. He noted, for 
example, that exemption under § 501(c) extended to a variety of organizations not eligible to receive 
deductible contributions under § 170 and that exemption is largely irrelevant for many organizations 
that rely mainly on donations and spend most of their income. Id. at 72. In contrast to these 
organizations, Hansmann sought to identify a rationale for subsidizing non-profits that regularly 
accumulated income. Id. at 71–72. Although Hansmann may be correct that tax exemption is irrelevant 
for many charities, I believe that his broader point is in fact relevant to all the tax subsidies: such 
organizations deserve subsidized assistance—regardless of the specific form—to increase the efficient 
provision of goods and services subject to contract failure. Thus, for purposes of this Article, I see no 
reason to separate the broad arguments for the deduction from the broad arguments for tax exemption. 
 71. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980). In his prior 
work, Hansmann posited that the non-distribution constraint protects purchasers (whether donors or 
consumers) of goods and services likely to suffer from contract failure by reassuring them that non-
profit providers will use payments for the designated purposes instead of converting them to personal 
profits. This reassurance, he reasoned, made non-profits more efficient providers in areas otherwise 
susceptible to contract failure. He emphasized two specific contract failures. The first occurs where the 
donor cannot judge the extent to which her payment was used for the promised service. This can 
happen in a variety of contexts. Perhaps the donor lives in the United States and has given money for 
the assistance of earthquake victims in Haiti. Because of the separation between the two, the donor 
cannot verify that her payments were used at all to assist the earthquake victims or how well they were 
used. Alternatively, perhaps the donor contributed to an organization providing public goods, such as 
public radio, or purchased a ticket to the opera. Because of the nature of the good purchased, the donor 
has no way of knowing whether her contribution increased either the quantity or quality of the radio 
programming or the opera. The second type of contract failure occurs when the purchased good or 
service is too complex for the consumer to be able to judge its quality on her own—for example, 
medical care. Id. at 846–58, 862–68. 
 72. Hansmann, supra note 43, at 72. 
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detriment by serving as a subsidy.
73
 In his view, the efficiency gains from 
increasing the non-profit provision of these goods and services outweighed 
the cost of tax exemption, thus justifying the subsidy.
74
 Hansmann further 
argued that since most organizations providing public goods or otherwise 
redistributing wealth ―in a socially desirable manner‖ suffered from 
contract failure, there was no need to further justify exempting such 
organizations from tax.
75
 Moreover, he reasoned that if merely providing 
public goods or subsidizing aid to the poor justified a tax subsidy, there 
would be no theoretical reason to limit the subsidy to non-profit firms.
76
 
Yet for-profit firms likely would not need a tax subsidy to survive, thus 
underscoring to Hansmann the necessity for requiring contract failure (as 
opposed to looking at the merits of the good or service provided) as a 
trigger for obtaining a subsidy.
77
  
Like Hansmann, the next wave of economic-based scholarship 
recognized the crucial role that market failure played in justifying the 
charitable tax subsidies.
78
 This literature, however, also weaved in public-
choice theory to flesh out why the charitable subsidies were implemented 
through the tax system (as opposed to other subsidy mechanisms).
79
 More 
specifically, this work posits that charitable tax subsidies are warranted 
because a democratic process dependent on majority preferences only 
supplies public goods at a level demanded by the median voter.
80
 This 
majority thus supplies ―some public goods (for example, a lighthouse or 
national defense) but not others (perhaps a community theater).‖81 
 
 
 73. Id. More recently, Nina Crimm has articulated a related argument that exemption 
compensates non-profits for the risk inherent in providing public goods and services, thus justifying 
the subsidy. Crimm, supra note 64, at 439. 
 74. Hansmann, supra note 43, at 72–74. 
 75. Id. at 91. 
 76. Id. at 91–92.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Although many of the early works that focused on the economic subsidy theory (such as 
those of Hansmann and Hall and Colombo) explicitly addressed tax exemption, later pieces on the 
deduction (such as those of Gergen, Levmore and Schizer) specifically built upon these exemption 
works. As Colombo and Hall have recognized, analytical interpretations of one generally apply to the 
other. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 20. 
 79. Although Hansmann touched on the relative pros and cons of non-profit versus government 
provision of services susceptible to contract failure, Hansmann, supra note 71, at 894–95, and briefly 
noted that ―bureaucratic mechanisms . . . and [other] constraints and influences‖ might affect the 
feasibility of governmental subsidies other than tax subsidies, Hansmann, supra note 43, at 92 n.113, 
he did not address in any detail the pros and cons of administering the subsidy through the tax system 
or why the government would agree to subsidize activities that the median voter had failed fully to 
fund. 
 80. Miranda P. Fleischer, Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and Charitable Giving, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 165, 185–86 (2008). 
 81. Id. at 168.  
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Individuals who support the under-supplied public goods, however, unite 
to form a ―new majority‖ that provides partial funding (via a tax subsidy) 
for each other‘s preferred minority projects.82 In that manner, the 
charitable tax subsidies allow individuals whose preferences differ from 
those of the classic majority
83
 to redirect a portion of funds otherwise 
flowing to the federal fisc toward their visions of the public good.
84
 
2. Refinements of the Basic Economic Subsidy Theory: Efficiency, 
Pluralism, and the Donative Theory 
Building on the economic subsidy theory outlined above, a number of 
scholars have offered refinements that focus on the benefits stemming 
from structuring subsidies for public-benefiting projects in this manner:
85
 
 
 
 82. Id. at 168–69; see also COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 107–08; Weisbrod, supra note 
69, at 36.  
 83. Although majority preferences do not always prevail due to intrinsic characteristics of our 
legislative system, the existing literature generally uses such a model for simplicity. See Fleischer, 
supra note 80, at 167–68 n.10. 
 84. Because the subsidies flow through the tax system, they essentially allow individual 
taxpayers to decide how to allocate federal funds. Take the charitable deduction, for example. A 
taxpayer who donates $100 to the opera and receives a $100 deduction reduces her taxes by $35 
(assuming a 35% marginal tax bracket). This means that although the opera receives $100, she is only 
out of pocket $65. The federal government is out the remaining $35. In effect, she has directed $35 of 
federal funds to a project she has deemed worthy of federal funds. Although the matching element is 
less obvious, both tax exemption and the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds also allow individuals 
(instead of the government) to decide which specific projects receive a government subsidy: all that is 
necessary is for one or more individuals to form an organization that qualifies for § 501(c)(3) (tax 
exemption) or § 145 (exempt bonds). In this manner, it is up to a given individual or group of 
individuals to decide whether to start an art museum, a hospital, or a tutoring program. See, e.g., 
Bittker, supra note 55 (comparing the charitable deduction to a matching grant system); Saul Levmore, 
Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 405 (1998); McDaniel, supra note 64, at 379–80, 390–94, 
396–99 (arguing that the charitable deduction has many characteristics of a matching grant system but 
that an actual matching grant system would better serve the goal of pluralism without increasing 
government intrusion or decreasing incentives to make contributions). 
 85. In addition to the work discussed above that justifies the charitable tax subsidies as a 
theoretical matter, a large and important body of scholarship considers the narrower (but also 
important) question of what rules should apply to charities in order to ensure that they play the role 
envisioned for them in society. See Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt 
and Covert, 66 TENN. L. REV. 687, 688–93 (1999); C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward 
More Simple and Effective Giving: Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions and 
Charitable Organizations, 12 AM. J. TAX POL‘Y 399, 401–02 (1995). Specific issues include (1) 
whether (and if so, to what extent) charities should be allowed to engage in lobbying and political 
activity, see, e.g., Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the Internal Revenue 
Code’s Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1269 (1993); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What 
is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried About?, 26 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 485 (2008); Donald 
B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous 
for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313 (2007); (2) the appropriate treatment of commercial activity by 
charities, see, e.g., John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 487 (2002); Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the History and 
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enhancing efficiency, promoting pluralism, and determining deservedness. 
These bodies of work generally attempt to avoid making value-based 
judgments as to what activities should count as ―charitable‖ and, in some 
cases, explicitly extol the virtues of not engaging in such judgments. This 
is not to say that distributional questions are wholly absent from these 
works: in the 1970s and 1980s, many scholars debated replacing the tax 
deduction with a tax credit or a matching grant, in part due to 
distributional considerations.
86
 While that work suggests distributional 
questions matter for the technical structure of the subsidies (that is, credit 
versus deduction versus grant), it stopped short of analyzing how the same 
questions might affect the subsidies‘ definitional structure (that is, what 
should qualify for the subsidies). As argued in the next part, however, 
making such judgments is unavoidable—rendering the following 
refinements of the economic subsidy theory necessary but not sufficient 
for a full understanding of the charitable tax subsidies.  
a. Efficiency  
One such refinement (specifically addressing the deduction, as opposed 
to exemption) argues that subsidizing public goods through a tax 
deduction
87
 is more efficient than so doing via direct governmental 
grants.
88
 Namely, structuring the subsidy as a deduction (or credit) 
allocates the cost of subsidizing a given charitable project among 
individuals in proportion to the value each places on that project.
89
 Those 
 
 
Political Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L.J. 1475 (2005); (3) the 
appropriate balance between spending and saving and the role of endowments, see, e.g., Evelyn Brody, 
Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 873 (1997); Henry 
Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (1990); (4) the continued 
usefulness of the non-distribution constraint, see, e.g., Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for 
For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017 (2007); and (5) anti-abuse rules for private foundations, see, 
e.g., Richard L. Schmalbeck, Reconsidering Private Foundation Investment Limitations, 58 TAX L. 
REV. 59 (2004); Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 Private Foundations Law: Historical Perspectives on Its 
Origins and Underpinnings, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 52 (2000). 
 86. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 55; Griffith, supra note 53; McDaniel, supra note 64; see infra 
Part III.C.  
 87. Debate still lingers, however, over whether a deduction or credit is the most efficient way of 
subsidizing charity through the tax system. Compare Jeff Strnad, The Charitable Contribution 
Deduction: A Politico-Economic Analysis, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 69, at 265, 272–76 (supporting a deduction), with Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, The 
Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 69, at 224, 236 (supporting a credit).  
 88. Gergen, supra note 52, at 1399–1406 (summarizing the works of Hochman and Rogers and 
Weisbrod). 
 89. Id. 
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with a high demand for a charitable project pay ―more‖ for that project by 
making a donation out of their own pocket.
90
 Persons with a low demand 
for a given project pay less by not making a voluntary contribution, but 
indirectly pay something (through the tax system) for that project to reflect 
the fact that they still receive some benefit (even if small) from the 
project.
91
 In contrast, direct grants would require that the government 
increase taxes across the board, and it is highly unlikely that the increase 
in a given individual‘s taxes would be proportional to how much she 
values the good being subsidized.
92
 In this manner, tax subsidies 
approximate a Lindahl solution,
93
 where the marginal benefits received by 
a given individual (whether or not a voluntary contributor) equal her 
marginal costs (including both voluntary contributions and cost-shifting 
from taxes necessary for the subsidy).
94
  
Proponents of this refinement (such as Gergen, who focused on the 
charitable deduction) and proponents of the original economic subsidy 
theories (such as Hansmann, who focused on the exemption) argue that 
focusing on economic explanations allows one to judge whether a given 
charity deserves a subsidy without getting into messy questions about the 
moral value of its activities.
95
 Instead, one only need ask non-value-based, 
empirical questions: does an organization provide either public or quasi-
public goods,
96
 and is it subject to the type of free-rider problems that 
cause market failure? If so, it deserves a subsidy; if not, it does not deserve 
a subsidy.
97
 Under this view, for example, churches would not merit a 
 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. For a discussion of whether it is morally ―fair‖ to force low-demanders to partially 
subsidize such goods, see id. at 1401 n.27. Gergen reasons that here, the bargain is ―fair‖ because 
everyone has either the possibility of channeling federal funds to his or her project or the possibility of 
benefiting from others‘ projects as a recipient of charitable goods and services. Id.  
 92. Id. at 1402. 
 93. As Mark Gergen explains:  
In a Lindahl solution [or benefits pricing], a collective good is funded at the level where the 
sum of the incremental benefits individuals derive from the last unit of the good equals the 
marginal cost of that unit, and each individual contributes an amount equal to her marginal 
benefit from the last unit of the good times the number of units provided.  
Id. at 1400 (footnotes omitted).  
 94. See id. at 1400–06 (summarizing the works of Hochman and Rodgers and Weisbrod on this 
point); Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 87, at 228, 233–35 (arguing that a credit approximates a 
Lindahl solution); Strnad, supra note 87, at 269–76 (arguing that a deduction better approximates a 
Lindahl solution than a credit). 
 95. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 52, at 1396; Hansmann, supra note 43, at 66 (rejecting the 
existence of ―beneficial externalities‖ as a justification for tax exemption). 
 96. That is, goods that are not pure public goods yet are still subject to free-rider problems or 
other market failures.  
 97. Gergen, supra note 52, at 1396. 
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subsidy because the club-like nature of the group minimizes free-riding.
98
 
Nor would public radio deserve a subsidy, since modern technology makes 
market provision possible.
99
 The economic subsidy theory for the 
deduction therefore makes no explicit claims about the substantive moral 
value of the various goods and services provided by charities (although, as 
explained below, it does make claims about the moral value of 
individuals‘ preferences about subsidizing charities).100 
b. Pluralism 
Also building on the public goods economic-subsidy argument, a 
second group of scholars has focused on the pluralism-enhancing benefits 
of having individual taxpayers determine which projects merit subsidies.
101
 
In that respect, these scholars have somewhat married the economic 
efficiency analysis with the more traditional values-based analyses by 
celebrating values other than pure efficiency. This marriage has limits, 
however, as even these scholars generally avoid value-based claims about 
―what‖ is being subsidized, continuing to focus on value-based claims 
about ―how‖ the subsidies are structured. These scholars, therefore, forego 
any normative value judgments about the particular goods and services 
being subsidized, instead emphasizing the values that flow from 
subsidizing public goods as a class via the charitable deduction and tax 
exemption.  
 
 
 98. Id. at 1438. 
 99. See id. at 1444 n.176. 
 100. But see infra Part III.B.2. 
 101. Unfortunately, it is somewhat unclear exactly what these theorists mean when they invoke 
―pluralism‖ and related terms (such as ―diversity‖). Often, it seems they believe our society should 
affirmatively seek to encourage numerous views in order to promote a counter-weight to government 
power, experimentation in the way public goods are produced, a rich debate, a marketplace of ideas, 
and the like. Another take on pluralism, however, is that we live in a pluralistic society where 
individuals have differing conceptions of what is beneficial to society and that, in the interests of 
neutrality, the tax subsidies should not differentiate among them. Pluralism can thus encompass either 
a positive duty to promote alternative viewpoints or, more simply, a duty not to discriminate among 
various viewpoints. Both understandings of ―pluralism‖ seem to be present in discussions of the 
charitable tax subsidies. With respect to the former, by subsidizing non-governmental groups in the 
first instance, they promote a counterbalance to government power and allow for experimentation in 
the ways that problems are attacked (for example, attacking poverty not only with programs like WIC 
but also with groups like Dress for Success); this seems to be the more common use of the concept in 
the current literature. With respect to the latter, once a goal has been deemed desirable for purposes of 
the subsidies (such as religion or public-interest litigation), the subsidies do not discriminate among 
religions, or between left-leaning and right-leaning cause-oriented legal groups. This Part interprets the 
current literature as focusing mainly on the first interpretation, although the implications of the 
distinctions between the two understandings are explored in the text accompanying notes 148–50.  
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Professor Saul Levmore, for example, has characterized the charitable 
deduction as a mechanism for allowing individual taxpayers to ―vote‖ on 
which projects deserve federal subsidies and at what level.
102
 
Qualitatively, Levmore posits that taxpayers who have a direct say in 
deciding which projects to fund (instead of being told by the government 
which projects are being funded) will develop a greater commitment to 
such projects, be more active volunteers and monitors, and be more 
tolerant both of redistribution and of greater government funding of public 
goods.
103
 He also suggests that this direct taxpayer involvement may 
remove opportunities for ―rent-seeking‖ that might otherwise occur during 
the legislative process for allocating subsidies.
104
  
On a quantitative level, Levmore has characterized the charitable 
deduction as an ―ongoing vote‖ that allows taxpayers whose funding 
preferences depend on the preferences of others to receive information 
about others‘ preferences before voting.105 For example, some taxpayers 
may want to know that a given project has a certain amount of support 
from others before voting to allocate funds to it, while others might prefer 
to donate only to projects in which their contribution makes a ―real 
difference.‖106 In both instances, however, the size of the governmental 
subsidy reflects the enthusiasm of taxpayers for a given project.
107
  
Building on the foregoing, Professor David Schizer has recently 
explored how institutional design affects the extent to which the charitable 
deduction achieves a number of value-based goals that are extrinsic to the 
specific goods and services being subsidized (encouraging generosity, 
 
 
 102. Levmore, supra note 84, at 405. This is so because when someone makes a charitable 
contribution and takes a corresponding deduction, she has just ―voted‖ for that charity to receive a 
federal subsidy equal to the foregone tax revenue. For example, by making a $100 donation, a taxpayer 
has voted for that charity to receive a $35 subsidy. This structure draws two common criticisms, both 
of which Levmore acknowledges. First, allowing taxpayers to vote in this manner could be compared 
to a ―poll tax‖ because any given individual must make a contribution out-of-pocket in order to trigger 
the subsidy. Id. at 405–06. Second, structuring the subsidy as a deduction gives more ―votes‖ to 
higher-bracket taxpayers, id., because of the ―upside down effect‖ inherent in any deduction. See infra 
notes 235–38, and accompanying text for an explanation of this effect. The latter criticism could be 
addressed by replacing the deduction with a credit, although the poll-tax criticism would remain even 
with a credit. 
 103. Levmore, supra note 84, at 406. 
 104. Id. at 408. Although Levmore is not entirely convinced by this ―optimistic‖ view of 
legislative behavior, neither is he entirely convinced by the contrary, pessimistic view that the costs to 
Congress for retaining control over these decisions outweigh the benefits. Id. 
 105. Id. at 411.  
 106. Id. at 412. 
 107. See id. at 411–12; David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, 
Information and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals 9–10 (Columbia Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
327, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=1097644.  
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reflecting popular preferences about public benefiting projects, and 
promoting the monitoring of quality).
108
 Schizer emphasizes that each of 
these goals has different implications for the optimal design of the 
subsidies, requiring trade-offs among these goals.
109
 For example, he 
argues that the goal of encouraging generosity in order to increase 
donations suggests that the subsidies should be focused on higher-bracket 
donors, who are more responsive to tax subsidies.
110
 Such a focus, 
however, would likely lead to the over-representation of the views of the 
wealthy in the funding process, thus undercutting the second goal of 
reflecting popular preferences.
111
 On the other hand, taking steps to 
enhance the extent to which the subsidies reflect popular preferences (such 
as capping the subsidies given to the wealthy or limiting the subsidy to 
causes with broad support) would impede the goals of encouraging 
generosity and monitoring by donors.
112
 Similarly, encouraging donors to 
target their gifts to fewer causes (in order to make it easier to keep tabs on 
each one) would enhance monitoring but might not reflect popular 
preferences well.
113
  
In this analysis, Schizer largely ignores value-based questions of 
―what‖ is being subsidized. Although he notes that increasing the 
substantive limits on the subsidy might better reflect popular preferences 
or minimize allocation errors,
114
 he rejects such limits on the grounds that 
they would inhibit donor generosity and overly complicate the structure of 
the subsidy.
115
 In his view, giving donors the widest latitude possible in 
 
 
 108. Id. at 2. 
 109. Id. at 3. 
 110. Id. at 15–16. Additionally, Schizer argues that the goal of encouraging generosity suggests 
increasing the subsidy made available through the charitable deduction and decreasing the subsidy 
made available through tax exemption (which is not directly tied to receiving donations). Id. at 17–18. 
 111. This, Schizer argues, is simply the ―price we must pay‖ for the advantages that stem from the 
flexible nature of the deduction. Id. at 33. Schizer assumes that ―charity tends to be redistributive,‖ and 
therefore assumes that the charitable deduction promotes voluntary redistribution. Id. at 16. Because of 
these assumptions, his main concern about targeting subsidies to the wealthy is whether this gives 
them disproportionate influence over which public goals are pursued. Id. Even here, however, Schizer 
notes that if wealthy donors under-invest in projects that represent broader preferences, ―the 
government is free to pick up the slack,‖ and he recognizes but does not address the opposite concern 
of donors who invest in ―idiosyncratic projects of little social value.‖ Id. at 32. In my view, Schizer 
underemphasizes the latter concern and assumes too much about the redistributive effect of charity.  
 112. Id. at 3, 43–44.  
 113. Id. at 53–55. 
 114. Id. at 37–38. 
 115. Id. at 38–39. He rightly notes, for example, that determining the extent to which charities 
meet certain intrinsic substantive goals can be difficult. Id. For example, if poverty relief is favored, he 
wonders whether a law school will qualify ―by offering financial aid for poor students and clinical 
programs for indigent clients‖ and how law school expenses should be allocated to these projects. Id. 
at 38. I do not minimize the difficulty of these questions. Indeed, my goal in this Article is to 
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choosing projects (subject to the constraint that the project actually be 
charitable rather than a disguised purchase of goods or services) best 
serves the dual goals of enhancing donor generosity and encouraging 
monitoring.
116
 The one constraint Schizer appears to favor is imposing 
participation limits whereby a donor can claim a deduction only if a 
certain number of other people also contribute to the project in question.
117
 
c. The Donative Theory  
A third refinement, termed the ―donative theory‖ by proponents John 
Colombo and Mark Hall in their work on tax exemption, likewise focuses 
on the benefits of having individual taxpayers determine which activities 
deserve a subsidy.
118
 They propose that only organizations receiving a 
―substantial level of support from the public‖ merit subsidies via tax 
exemption and the ability to receive deductible contributions.
119
 Building 
upon the market- and government-failure theories proposed by earlier 
scholars, Colombo and Hall argue that the existence of voluntary 
donations to an organization is itself a signal that the organization‘s 
activities are undersupplied by the market or government—thus 
demonstrating the organization‘s need for a subsidy.120 They further 
reason that such voluntary donations demonstrate that the public at large 
considers the goods or services beneficial to the community—thus 
demonstrating the organization‘s deservedness of a subsidy.121  
Like much of the other economic subsidy work, Colombo and Hall 
argue that their test enables one to determine whether an organization 
merits a subsidy by asking a simple empirical question: does the group 
receive a threshold amount of donations from the general public or not?
122
 
While Colombo and Hall contend that this test both better describes 
current law and better comports with historical conceptions of charitable 
 
 
demonstrate that even in spite of these difficulties, addressing these questions will improve our 
understanding of the charitable tax subsidies.  
 116. Id. at 34–35. 
 117. Id. 
 118. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 99. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 107. One might wonder why donations alone are not enough to fund the activity at an 
appropriate level. Colombo and Hall respond that voluntary donations are subject to the same free-
rider problems that plague market provision, thus requiring a further subsidy from the government. Id. 
at 104–05.  
 121. Id. at 163. 
 122. Id. at 193–218. Specifically, the general test proposed by Colombo and Hall would limit 
subsidies to organizations receiving at least one-third of their revenue from donations. Id. 
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activity than prior subsidy theories,
123
 their test still attempts to set aside 
questions about the intrinsic value of the activity subsidized. Although 
Colombo and Hall (unlike many other theorists) explicitly address moral 
theory concerns, they do so only to argue that the donative theory is 
consistent with the leading theories of distributive justice.
124
 They do not, 
however, address what such theories might tell us about what should be 
considered charitable.  
III. A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE CHARITABLE TAX SUBSIDIES 
REQUIRES AN EXPLICIT CONSIDERATION OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
As this Part argues, explicitly considering distributive justice—
alongside the issues currently highlighted—is necessary for a clearer 
understanding of the charitable tax subsidies
125
 on both a theoretical and a 
practical level.
126
 This is so for three reasons. First, existing scholarship—
which generally ignores distributive justice issues—is incomplete and 
inconsistent for so doing: it is incomplete because it does not adequately 
identify which projects deserve a subsidy and the amount of that subsidy; 
it is inconsistent because it implicitly contains value judgments that have 
distributive justice implications but that are unacknowledged (and often 
disavowed) by their proponents. Second, popular criticisms of the 
charitable tax subsidies raise distributive justice issues that have not been 
adequately addressed. And lastly, the law governing charities and exempt 
organizations is itself confused on the role of distributive justice.  
 
 
 123. Colombo and Hall mention, among others, Henry Hansmann‘s ―capital subsidy theory,‖ id. at 
83–86, Rob Atkinson‘s ―altruism theory,‖ id. at 87–90, and the ―public trust variant‖ theory, id. at 90–
92.  
 124. Id. at 147–58. 
 125. As the reader will notice, the remainder of this Article focuses on the subsidy theories for tax 
exemption and the charitable deduction instead of the measurement theories. This is so because the 
former are widely regarded—both inside and outside academia—as the better explanation for the tax 
benefits given to charities. Pozen, supra note 11, at 552. That said, distributive justice concerns bear 
consideration even under the measurement theories. In a number of areas where a deduction is 
otherwise justified on measurement grounds, Congress has chosen to deny or limit the deduction for 
public policy reasons. Consider, for example, the prohibition against deducting fines in § 162(f) or the 
limits on deducting ―excess‖ executive compensation in § 162(m). It may thus be the case, therefore, 
that even if tax exemption and the charitable deduction are justified as a general matter on 
measurement grounds, there may be distributive justice-related public policy considerations that 
warrant limiting exemption and deductibility.  
 126. As Simon et al., have noted, a puzzle exists as to ―whether and how exemption or other 
beneficial treatment in the tax law should be conditioned on redistribution (particularly, redistribution 
to the poor.‖). Simon et al., supra note 7, at 277.  
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A. Existing Scholarship Is Incomplete Because It Does Not Adequately 
Identify Which Projects Merit Subsidies  
As demonstrated above, most—but not all—recent scholarship 
theorizing the charitable tax subsidies attempts to avoid content-based 
definitions of what should be considered charitable.
127
 The traditional 
subsidy theory is an exception, but the standards by which it defines 
charity are unhelpful. As a result, our theoretical understanding of what 
projects merit assistance under the charitable tax subsidies is wanting.
128
  
1. The Traditional Subsidy Theories 
The traditional subsidy theory demonstrates this most clearly. Although 
it focuses on the ―good‖ things charities do for society, it contains 
standards which, standing alone, are too vague to be useful. To say that 
charities do ―good‖ things that ―benefit society‖ is meaningless without 
some conception of what is ―good.‖129 To say that charities should be 
subsidized because they relieve the government of burdens it would 
otherwise bear is largely meaningless without some sense of what 
government should be doing. To say that charities merit subsidy because 
they provide diverse and creative solutions to society‘s problems is 
similarly meaningless without a sense of what counts as a problem and 
which problems should be solved. Lastly, asserting that the altruistic 
nature of charitable giving merits a subsidy does not answer the question 
of whether all altruistic acts are equally worthy of a subsidy. The 
traditional subsidy theories are therefore too vague to adequately identify 
which projects merit a subsidy.
130
  
 
 
 127. Moreover, as explained in Part III.D, the legal requirements contained in §§ 170(c) and 
501(c)(3) in effect forego determining eligibility based on the worthiness of an organization‘s 
activities; instead they focus on procedural rules such as the private inurement doctrine.  
 128. As Colombo and Hall have recognized, we need more guidance when we are trying to 
identify ―activities that deserve the financial support of society.‖ COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 
38 (emphasis removed). 
 129. See id. at 6 (―[W]hile our society superficially agrees that certain ‗good activities‘ are entitled 
to tax exemption, this superficial agreement masks considerable confusion over precisely what good 
activities qualify as charitable and why they are deserving of tax exemption.‖). 
 130. The same is true of parallel definitions of charity that inform current tax interpretations of 
charity. For example, much of our understanding of what should be considered charitable for tax 
purposes comes from the law of charitable trusts. Id. at 33. The definition of ―charity‖ from charitable 
trust law, however, is equally vague. For example, the Restatement of Trusts defines charitable 
purposes as including the following: ―(a) the relief of poverty; (b) the advancement of education; (c) 
the advancement of religion; (d) the promotion of health; (e) governmental or municipal purposes; and 
(f) other purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the community.‖ RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (2001). As Colombo and Hall have noted, however, under trust law,  
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2. The Economic Subsidy Theory and Its Refinements 
Later scholars reacted to this vagueness by attempting to create 
objective tests for determining which projects should be subsidized. Some 
theorists (such as Mark Gergen, a proponent of the efficiency refinement) 
argue that objective tests are necessary because of the impossibility of 
defining charity in terms of the moral worthiness of various activities.
131
 
Other theorists, such as pluralists Saul Levmore and David Schizer, seem 
to concede that one could distinguish among the worthiness of various 
projects based on their activities, but that so doing is undesirable.
132
 In 
their view, allowing individual taxpayers to determine which projects 
receive subsidies is itself valuable in our pluralistic society.
133
 
These bodies of work thus appear to successfully avoid defining charity 
in terms of normative assessments about the ―goodness‖ of various 
charitable activities. The efficiency theorists would limit the subsidies to 
public or quasi-public goods that suffer from market and government 
failure due to free-riding, positive externalities, and the like.
134
 The 
pluralism scholars would subsidize any project that is not self-benefiting 
and obtains support from some threshold number of others.
135
 Proponents 
 
 
virtually any substantive purpose will suffice. Charity is ―broad enough to include whatever 
will promote, in a legitimate way, the comfort, happiness and improvement of an indefinite 
number of persons.‖ As the Supreme Court declared over a century ago, charity includes 
―anything that tends to promote the well-doing and well-being of social man.‖ Students of the 
law of charity acknowledge that ―[n]early everything produced by . . . private industry—
ranging from buildings and food to books and music—contributes to our welfare.‖ ―In a 
sense, all legitimate economic activities are affected with a public interest.‖  
COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 38 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 131. Gergen, supra note 52, at 1396. As Gergen argues, too many currently subsidized activities 
are either controversial or trivial, too few are morally privileged, and the risk that ―some 
‗wrongheaded‘ people will support the wrong things (satanist [sic] churches or racist schools) and 
refuse to support the right things‖ is inevitable. Id. Gergen concludes that ―[c]laims for the moral 
priority of charitable causes cannot justify a deduction in anything like its present form.‖ Id. Ironically, 
Gergen seems to be invoking moral judgments precisely to argue that the definition of charitable 
should eschew such judgments. 
 132. Levmore, supra note 84, at 408, 415 n.82; Schizer, supra note 107, at 36–39. 
 133. As explained in note 101, this seems to reflect a view that encouraging a variety of 
viewpoints (that is, affirmatively subsidizing pluralism) is itself good, rather than a view that non-
discrimination among competing views of justice or the good is valuable. The distinctions are fine, 
however, and these scholars may well also value the latter understanding of pluralism.  
 134. Gergen, supra note 52, at 1396 (arguing that ―these theories do not depend upon claims about 
the moral worth of what charities do. The case for a deduction on efficiency or equity grounds turns, at 
last, on empirical questions . . . that may be answered without regard to whether charities‘ activities are 
themselves good or just.‖); see also Hansmann, supra note 43, at 96 (―[E]xemption . . . should not be 
viewed simplistically as a subsidy for good works . . . .‖).  
 135. See, e.g., COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 99; Levmore, supra note 84, at 404–18; 
Schizer, supra note 107, at 14–15, 34–35. 
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of these works would thus have us believe that the only questions one 
needs to ask (depending on whether one is focusing on efficiency or 
pluralism, respectively)
136
 are objective: Is the project a pure or impure 
public good? Does it suffer from market and government failure? Does the 
project somehow benefit the donor? Does it have the necessary support 
from individuals other than the donor?  
Unfortunately, however, further questions remain. On the most 
practical level, we live in a world of scarce resources.
137
 It may be the case 
that in an ideal world, we would subsidize all such projects. But if scarce 
resources force us to choose among a plethora of eligible projects, we need 
some method of determining which projects will ultimately be subsidized. 
How do we determine which projects are most worthy when we have to 
prioritize? With respect to private goods, markets measure preferences in 
such situations. In contrast, however, markets cannot measure preferences 
for pure public goods. Markets cannot tell us, for example, whether people 
want clean air, how much clean air they want, and at what price.
138
 We 
therefore need some normative theory beyond Pareto efficiency
139
 to 
justify subsidizing public goods in this manner.
140
 
a. Pluralism’s Unanswered Questions 
Moreover, the efficiency and pluralism scholars each face further 
questions stemming from the tests they proffer. Take the pluralists‘ 
argument that voluntary donations by a threshold number of individuals 
 
 
 136. To be sure, pluralism and efficiency are not either/or propositions, and many scholars seem 
to celebrate both goals.  
 137. See Schizer, supra note 107, at 26–27. 
 138. Economists sometimes answer such questions by referring to Musgrave‘s concept of ―merit 
goods,‖ which are goods that should be provided to society even if not specifically demanded. Richard 
A. Musgrave, Merit Goods, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 452 (John 
Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). As later economists have noted, however, ―The term merit good merely 
becomes a formal designation for the unadorned value judgment that [such projects] are good for 
society and therefore deserve financial support.‖ HARVEY ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 47 (6th ed. 2002) 
(citing Baumol and Blinder (1981)).  
 139. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 138, at 47 (―Despite its appeal, Pareto efficiency has no obvious 
claim as an ethical norm. Society may prefer an inefficient allocation on the basis of equity or some 
other criterion.‖). 
 140. Presumably, the efficiency-focused scholars would turn to some form of cost-benefit analysis 
in order to allocate scarce governmental resources. As traditionally applied, such an analysis monetizes 
all values being considered, although it leaves out certain intangibles. To that end, some scholars have 
started to favor a variation of cost-benefit analysis known as ―well-being analysis‖ (which does take 
into account intangibles that significantly affect happiness). This analysis almost necessarily entails 
consideration of certain utilitarian issues, including the implications of the happiness research. This is 
just one example of how a more careful consideration of distributive justice could help allocate scarce 
resources in a manner that complements the work of the efficiency theorists.  
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signal that a project is worthy of a subsidy. On the most neutral level 
(borrowing an example from David Schizer), why does the fact that a 
group of people want a ketchup museum justify subsidizing it?
141
 Existing 
literature responds that tying the subsidy to the amount of donations means 
that groups with fewer supporters get less of a subsidy.
142
 But this does not 
answer the threshold question of why such an organization deserves any 
subsidy in the first instance.  
This question becomes more acute in instances where the subsidized 
activity is not merely ―silly‖ (like the ketchup museum), but one that 
strikes many as wrong or immoral (for example, a non-profit school that 
admitted only Caucasian students). Current law responds to this dilemma 
with the public policy requirement articulated in the Bob Jones case:
143
 to 
receive the charitable tax subsidies, organizations may not engage in 
activities antithetical to established public policy.
144
 But this, of course, 
invokes value judgments about what is and is not antithetical to public 
policy—not to mention the fact that the very notion of ―public policy‖ 
invokes value judgments.
145
 Resorting to Bob Jones therefore 
demonstrates that there must be some limits on what is subsidized.  
At this point, one might respond that limits should be imposed only in 
extreme cases (such as Bob Jones) and that minimizing value judgments as 
much as possible is necessary to articulate the kind of expansive definition 
that best serves pluralistic values.
146
 Under this view, an extremely broad 
conception of charity enhances pluralism by making room for many 
different conceptions of what is ―good‖ for society without choosing 
among them.
147
  
 
 
 141. See Schizer, supra note 107, at 9–10, 35. To return to the distinction articulated in supra note 
101, should it be subsidized because it is valuable to have a rich marketplace of ideas, or should it be 
subsidized for non-discriminatory reasons? 
 142. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 164–67; Levmore, supra note 84, at 409; Schizer, 
supra note 107, at 35. 
 143. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding the denial of tax 
exemption to schools engaging in racially discriminatory practices, even when such practices are 
religiously based).  
 144. Id. at 575.  
 145. See Simon et al., supra note 7, at 280–81 (discussing such questions in the context of Bob 
Jones).  
 146. This was certainly the reaction I received whenever discussing this project with other 
scholars, whether at formal workshops or informally.  
 147. As can be seen, once discussions turn from the technical structure of the subsidies 
(deduction, grant, credit, etc.) to their substantive content, the type of pluralism that is invoked seems 
to change from one of subsidizing a variety of viewpoints to one of value-neutrality. See supra note 
101.  
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There are two problems with this response, however. First, it conflates 
the fact of pluralism (that is, that we live in a free and democratic society 
with room for several competing views of what is beneficial) with the 
normative claim that the charitable tax subsidies should themselves be 
pluralistic in nature. In other words, it confuses the concept of pluralism as 
allowing for a variety of viewpoints (pluralism as nondiscrimination) with 
the concept of pluralism as mandating that society is affirmatively better 
off when more, as opposed to fewer, viewpoints are heard (to use Anne 
Alstott‘s term, let‘s call this ―mandated pluralism‖).148 Wanting to respect 
the former might mean simply that we will not subsidize Catholic 
churches without also subsidizing Jewish synagogues, but it does not 
necessarily mean that we have to subsidize any places of worship in the 
first instance. It means that we cannot subsidize modern dance without 
also subsidizing classical ballet, not that we must affirmatively subsidize 
dance in the first place. In other words, it conflates the issue of wanting to 
act in a nondiscriminatory manner because we live in a pluralistic society 
with the issue of wanting affirmatively to promote (and not just tolerate) a 
variety of viewpoints.  
To take another example, suppose that one group of citizens considers 
opera and poor relief to be good and bird-watching to be bad, while 
another group considers poor relief and bird-watching to be good, and 
opera to be bad. As a normative matter, why does pluralism suggest 
subsidizing all three activities instead of only the activity both groups 
consider to be good?
149
 The latter is pluralistic in that it is 
nondiscriminatory; neither activity lacking complete support is subsidized. 
In contrast, the former is pluralistic in the mandatory sense by reflecting 
the idea that it is somehow beneficial to encourage (and not just tolerate) a 
range of viewpoints and activities.  
Moreover, more narrowly defining which activities should qualify as 
charitable does not necessarily undercut the principles of either pluralism 
in fact or mandatory pluralism. For example, suppose that Congress 
narrows the charitable tax subsidies to include only organizations that 
provide goods and services to individuals under a certain income level. 
Because the subsidies, as currently structured, still allow for individuals to 
decide which groups helping the poor deserve aid, they allow such groups 
 
 
 148. E-mail from Anne Alstott, Manley O. Hudson Professor, Harvard Law School, to Miranda P. 
Fleischer, Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law (Mar. 6, 2009, 08:50 MST) (on 
file with author).  
 149. See Part II.B for a descriptive justification of having a broad definition of charity that is 
rooted in public choice theory.  
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to counterbalance government power and flood the marketplace of poor 
relief with a variety of ideas about the best way to do so. Some might 
provide job training, others might provide suits for interviews, some might 
give food directly, some might teach the poor to grow their own 
vegetables, and so on. In that respect, mandatory pluralism is still 
respected, even under a narrower definition of what is charitable.  
The pluralists, therefore, need a normative justification for defining 
charity broadly—this may be fairness, it may be social harmony, or any 
number of reasons. But the point is that they must explicitly link the fact 
of pluralism to the normative case for an expansive definition of charity. 
In other words, they must link the nondiscriminatory aspect of pluralism to 
the mandatory aspect of it. And if the mandatory aspect is based on 
equality or on social welfare, why not also look to see how the content of 
the subsidies might affect those goals? 
Lastly, suppose that the pluralists do have a persuasive normative 
justification for broadly defining charity. Even so, they would be well 
served to fold moral theory into their analysis in order to ensure that the 
legal definition of charity really does have room for competing views of 
the good. To illustrate, take four of the most common theories of 
distributive justice:
150
 utilitarianism,
151
 the maximin theories,
152
 the 
capabilities approach,
153
 and egalitarianism.
154
  
 
 
 150. See, e.g., BRIGHOUSE, supra note 5, at vii (providing ―an account of the main kinds of 
theories of justice prevailing in contemporary political philosophy‖); WILL KYMLICKA, 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (providing ―an introduction to, and 
critical appraisal of, the major schools of thought which dominate contemporary debates in political 
philosophy‖); LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 40–75 (2002) (describing 
the ―issues in . . . political theory that bear most directly on the evaluation of tax policy,‖ including 
issues of distributive justice). 
 151. See infra Part IV.A. 
 152. See infra Part IV.B. 
 153. See infra Part IV.C. 
 154. See infra Part IV.D. 
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Utilitarianism
Capabilities
Maximin Equality
 
Next, assume that we want to define charity broadly, so as to include 
everything that would fall within any of these frameworks. A close look at 
each of these broad moral philosophies might suggest that the current 
definition of charity should be broader than it currently is. What if, for 
example, these four philosophies suggest that political donations should be 
subsidized? In other words, we need to make sure that everything within 
the Venn diagram above was included in the definition of charity. 
Alternatively, we might find that some activities currently considered 
charitable would not be so defined under all reasonable moral 
philosophies, and that the current definition should be narrowed in some 
respects. It could well be the case, for example, that there are other 
activities in addition to racial segregation which do not fall within any 
reasonable conception of the good. In other words, we need to make sure 
that the definition of charity does not include anything falling outside the 
above diagram. Explicitly considering what various strands of moral 
theory suggest for the charitable tax subsidies, therefore, is more helpful 
than blindly suggesting that ―anything goes.‖155 
 
 
 155. Taking a more explicit look at distributive justice could also help us allocate scarce 
resources, even if we started with the broad definition of charity described above. Assume, for 
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b. Efficiency’s Unanswered Questions 
The efficiency theories also raise some unanswered questions beyond 
those relating to scarce resources. Take, for example, the argument that 
some projects should be subsidized because they generate positive 
externalities that are undervalued by consumers.
156
 Many take for granted 
the fact that some such projects—such as education—produce positive 
benefits shared by society.
157
 In contrast, however, whether other 
activities—such as religion—produce positive externalities is more 
controversial. In both cases, one cannot decide whether or not a given 
activity generates a ―positive‖ externality without resorting to some 
underlying value judgments.
158
 Why is education good? Why do some feel 
religion is good and others feel it is bad? Expressed in more technical 
language, there may be some activities that are considered ―public goods‖ 
by some individuals but that are considered ―social costs‖ by others. The 
fact that some are willing to make a charitable donation to an activity does 
not itself render that activity a public good.  
Lastly, as explored in more detail below, the very act of emphasizing 
efficiency and/or pluralism represents a value judgment. It seems logical 
to ask whether a more specific definition of charity might further those 
goals more than the tests described above. For example, what if some 
activities actually undercut pluralism? What if subsidizing certain charities 
more than others was a Pareto-improving move?
159
 In short, current 
scholarship leaves several essential questions unanswered. The theories 
these scholars identify, therefore, are necessary but not sufficient for our 
understanding of the charitable tax subsidies.  
 
 
example, that we have come up with a definition of charity broad enough to encompass all the 
activities that the various moral theories in the diagram above suggest. We might still face a question 
of scarce resources, however. In that case, thinking about how the various theories overlap with one 
another may help allocate those scarce resources. We might decide, for example, to start by 
subsidizing those activities that fall within the reaches of all four moral theories. Then, resources 
permitting, we move onto those activities that fall within the overlap of three theories, then two, and so 
on. I thank Katie Pratt for this idea.  
 156. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 52, at 1398. 
 157. But see Henry Hansmann, The Changing Roles of Public, Private, and Nonprofit Enterprise 
in Education, Health Care, and Other Human Services, in INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
CHILD CARE, EDUCATION, MEDICAL CARE, AND LONG-TERM CARE IN AMERICA 245, 263–66 (Victor 
Fuchs ed., 1996) (questioning whether non-profit and public schools produce positive externalities).  
 158. Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 87, at 225. 
 159. That is, a move that ―makes some people better off and no person worse off.‖ Gergen, supra 
note 52, at 1401 (citing A. Atkinson & J. Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics 509 (1980)). 
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B. A Fuller Understanding of the Charitable Tax Subsidies Requires an 
Analysis of Distributive Justice 
As the foregoing suggests, although avoiding moral judgments about 
which activities merit subsidies based on their intrinsic worth may be 
attractive, it is unrealistic. At some point, addressing the ―goodness‖ of 
various charities becomes inevitable, as difficult as that may be. Why look 
to distributive justice as one means of so doing?
160
 First, the very roots of 
charity are grounded in notions of redistribution.
161
 Second, the 
justifications for subsidizing charity under the traditional subsidy theory 
invoke distributive justice issues.
162
 Third, distributive justice analysis is a 
logical complement to the work of those efficiency scholars who truly are 
concerned solely with wealth maximization (and not its distribution); and 
it is a necessary extension of the work of the efficiency and pluralism 
scholars whose work contains implicit and unacknowledged judgments 
about distributive justice issues. Lastly, scholarship on the charitable tax 
subsidies which does address distributive justice issues is insufficiently 
deep, for it does not engage the fundamental questions of distributive 
justice theory: what should be redistributed, and what is a just 
distribution? 
1. Distributive Justice and the Traditional Subsidy Theories  
As explained above, the traditional subsidy theories contain extremely 
vague justifications for the charitable tax subsidies: that charities do 
―good‖ things that ―benefit society,‖ that they relieve the government of 
burdens it would otherwise bear, that they provide diverse and creative 
solutions to society‘s problems, and that the act of altruism is itself 
meritorious.
163
 Determining what is good for and beneficial to society, 
what government should be doing, and which of society‘s problems should 
be solved inevitably raises distributive justice issues. Is anything that 
 
 
 160. Just as this Article argues that the pluralist- and efficiency-focused works are a necessary but 
not sufficient contribution to our understanding of the subsidies, it likewise argues that distributive 
justice is another necessary—but not sufficient—component of this analysis. In other words, this 
Article suggests that distributive justice should be looked at, but not necessarily in a vacuum. It may 
well be the case that other moral theories (such as communitarianism) can help extend our 
understanding of the subsidies even further. For example, David Brennen offers a thought-provoking 
argument that critical race theory should be used to complement existing scholarship on the tax 
subsidies. Brennen, supra note 65. 
 161. McNulty, supra note 7, at 247–48. 
 162. See Part III.B.1. 
 163. See Part III.A.1.  
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increases happiness good? Are poverty and inequality problems that 
should be addressed? If so, why? For those who subscribe to the 
traditional subsidy justification, a fuller understanding of distributive 
justice and its implications is necessary.
164
 
For example, it is generally undisputed as a traditional matter that one 
legitimate aim of charity is to help the poor.
165
 As explained previously,
166
 
this conception of charity has deep historical roots, dating at least as far 
back as the Statute of Charitable Uses
167
 and appearing in the early days of 
our nation‘s history.168 It also comports with what the average lay person 
generally considers charitable.
169
 Thus, a better understanding of who 
should be considered poor or disadvantaged, and what our duties to such 
persons are, can help us better allocate those philanthropic dollars 
dedicated to helping ―the poor.‖170 A close look at each of the common 
strands of distributive justice can help provide this understanding, thus 
fleshing out the traditional subsidy theories. 
2. Distributive Justice and the Economic Subsidy Theories  
Distributive justice is also a necessary tool for extending the work of 
those theorists who focus on efficiency and pluralism. This is true whether 
these theorists are agnostic about distributional questions (that is, 
recognize their importance but choose not to address them themselves) or 
 
 
 164. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 6 (―[W]hile our society superficially agrees that 
certain ‗good activities‘ are entitled to tax exemption, this superficial agreement masks considerable 
confusion over precisely what good activities qualify as charitable and why they are deserving of tax 
exemption.‖). 
 165. To be sure, charity may also serve other goals, but few, if any, would argue that helping the 
poor is not a main goal. For example, religious organizations have long received the benefits accorded 
other ―charities.‖ Historically, this stemmed from one of two varying conceptions of the church: either 
it was an arm of the state itself, in which case it should not be taxed because the state does not tax 
itself, or it was thought of as a sovereign organization (much like a foreign government) that the state 
had no right to tax. Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable 
Organizations: Its History & Underlying Policy, in IV RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE 
COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY & PUBLIC NEEDS 2025, 2027–28 (1977). 
 166. See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text. 
 167. The Statute of Charitable Uses exempted ―charitable, religious, and educational‖ trusts from 
the traditional constraints of trust law. Belknap, supra note 165, at 2027. The word ―charitable‖ in the 
listing of excepted gifts has been traditionally interpreted to mean poor-relief, which merited an 
exception because it relieved the government of a burden. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 47. 
 168. Belknap, supra note 165, at 2027–30 (describing state tax conceptions of charity). 
 169. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 6. 
 170. This may be especially true when the political climate advocates curtailing government 
benefits and instead encouraging more private aid to the poor. That is, if our society relies on charity in 
lieu of direct governmental aid, then a deeper understanding of what counts as ―charity‖ is necessary. 
McNulty, supra note 7, at 230–31. 
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seemingly hostile to such questions (that is, in search of value-neutral 
ways of thinking about the subsidies).
171
 
a. The “Agnostic” Subsidy Theories  
The argument that distributive questions should play some role in the 
overall legal scholarship on the charitable tax subsidies is least 
controversial if one views the subsidy theorists as working within the 
context of normative economics as it is traditionally understood—that is, 
as being concerned with wealth maximization (the size of the pie) and not 
its distribution.
172
 This appears to be true of some of the efficiency-
focused scholars (such as Hansmann and Hochman and Rodgers).
173
 It 
may also be true with respect to those pluralism scholars (such as Schizer) 
who have argued that wide donor choice increases the quality and 
efficiency of the activities subsidized.  
If so, then the very parameters of normative economics highlight the 
need for additional scholarship that does address distributive justice head-
on. Those parameters suggest that the efficiency scholars have done their 
job by identifying both the best justification for the tax subsidies and the 
best initial method of sorting through which projects do or do not merit a 
subsidy. They further suggest that normative distributional questions are 
not irrelevant, but simply not within their bailiwick.
174
 It is therefore not 
inconsistent with the efficiency scholarship to argue that additional 
scholarship is needed to pick up where the former leaves off in order to 
evaluate, as a normative matter, the distributional questions raised by the 
charitable tax subsidies.
175
 Indeed, the work of economists Harold 
Hochman and James Rodgers (part of the efficiency-focused school) 
 
 
 171. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 138, at 47 (arguing that welfare economics provides the tools 
necessary to describe the distributional consequences of a given policy but that value judgments are 
necessary to determine the desirability of those consequences).  
 172. See, e.g., DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 145 (2d ed. 2006) (arguing that under common views of economic 
efficiency, ―[e]conomists should be concerned to enlarge the pie and should leave its division to 
politicians and moralists‖); LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 5 
(2002) (noting that ―[u]nder a common understanding of normative economic analysis, legal rules are 
assessed by reference to wealth maximization or efficiency, criteria that many construe as . . . ignoring 
distributive concerns.‖); Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination, 
Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 636 (1993).  
 173. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.  
 174. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 172, at 5.  
 175. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 150, at 51 (―If efficiency were the only standard, 
there would be no way to choose between two policies neither of which was at least as good for 
everybody as the other.‖). 
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explicitly acknowledges the need for distributional value judgments by 
others about the subsidies.
176
  
Moreover, a small but important body of descriptive empirical work by 
economists buttresses this point by openly recognizing that distributive 
justice considerations should play some role in policy discussions. As 
economist Charles T. Clotfelter stated, ―Although few would argue that 
redistribution is the most important justification for maintaining nonprofit 
institutions, distributional impact remains one significant consideration, as 
it is in most areas of public policy.‖177 To that end, a number of 
economists have attempted to assess—as a descriptive matter—the 
distributional impact of the charitable tax subsidies.
178
 The most 
comprehensive analysis is a compilation of empirical studies, edited by 
Clotfelter, that contains sub-sector-by-sub-sector analyses of the benefits 
that each sub-sector produces and their distribution across households of 
various incomes.
179
  
Although this work is descriptive in nature, it assumes that 
policymakers have an underlying normative premise regarding how such 
benefits should be distributed. Indeed, the very existence of this work 
invites the asking of the more fundamental normative questions that are 
the domain of legal scholars: How much weight, if any, should 
policymakers give to distributive justice considerations when crafting 
charitable giving policy? Which theories of distributive justice should be 
given consideration? How should charity be defined to effectuate those 
considerations?  
 
 
 176. See, e.g., Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 87, at 233, 239 (stating clearly that the authors ―in 
no way den[y] an ultimate need, from a social perspective, for a distributional value judgment‖ but 
noting that economic discussions of whether a credit or deduction is the optimal treatment for 
voluntary contributions is not the place for such judgments). Interestingly, Hochman and Rodgers 
assert that using efficiency as a tool to study the structure of the subsidy avoids ―the strong value 
judgments implicit‖ in using equity-based arguments (such as the upside-down subsidy argument) 
about the structure. Id. at 238. As demonstrated in the next part, however, even their study of the 
structure contains implicit distributional claims.  
 177. See, e.g., Clotfelter, supra note 6, at 3 (compiling studies analyzing the beneficiaries of 
various categories of nonprofits by income). 
 178. See, e.g., William S. Vickrey, One Economist’s View of Philanthropy, in PHILANTHROPY 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 31, 44–55 (1962) (concluding that most beneficiaries of philanthropy are ―only a 
moderate distance down the scale‖ from philanthropic donors, ―rather than at the bottom‖); Jeffrey 
Schaefer, Philanthropic Contributions: Their Equity & Efficiency, 8 QUARTERLY REVIEW OF 
ECONOMICS 25, 30 (1968).  
 179. Clotfelter, supra note 6, at 9. The studies‘ general conclusion is that distributional impact 
differs by subsector, and that there is neither an overall pro-poor or pro-rich tilt to the beneficiaries. Id. 
at 3. 
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b. The “Hostile” Subsidy Theories  
Next, suppose that current scholars are not ignoring distributional 
questions simply because such questions are outside their domain, but 
because they truly think such questions can be avoided.
180
 As this part 
argues, not only is this unrealistic, but it is inconsistent: existing 
scholarship in this area is rife with unacknowledged—and insufficiently 
extended—value judgments.181  
First, these scholars ignore the fact that the subsidies in question are, at 
their core, redistributive.
182
 The government takes from some individuals 
(in the form of reduced services from foregone revenue, increased taxes, 
or a mix of both) and gives to others (those who benefit from charitable 
activities, whether as a donee, employee, patron, or otherwise).
183
 
Moreover, the charitable tax subsidies are not a stand-alone government 
program, but rather are part of the tax system—a system which by its very 
nature raises distributive justice issues in determining how the benefits and 
burdens of our society are to be apportioned. The government taxes some 
individuals to fund programs that benefit others.
184
 Sometimes this 
redistribution is from the rich to the poor, such as the redistribution 
resulting from the increasing marginal rate structure. Other times, it is 
from people engaging in one activity to people engaging in another, such 
as from savers to those making favored business expenditures. In any 
event, the charitable tax subsidies have redistributive effects, and that 
alone means that the desirability of these subsidies turns (at least in part) 
on an assessment of those effects.  
 
 
 180. See Griffith, supra note 53, at 345 (criticizing earlier scholars for lacking ―a coherent 
normative principle‖); see also Pozen, supra note 11, at 547, 558, 562. 
 181. Griffith, supra note 53, at 345 (arguing that ―a satisfactory tax policy must make its 
underlying ethical assumptions and distributional goals explicit.‖).  
 182. McNulty, supra note 7, at 247 (asserting that ―[a]ny analysis of philanthropy and its related 
tax allowances must consider that both its purpose and consequence is the redistribution of resources. 
Indeed, at an elemental level redistribution seems to be what philanthropy is.‖). As McNulty points 
out, this redistribution has multiple levels: from donors to donees and managers, from the public sector 
to the private, from the private sector to charities, and to and from various taxpayers due to a 
redistribution of the tax burden and after-tax wealth. Id. at 247–48.  
 183. To be sure, it is not always easy to identify who benefits from the subsidy. See RICHARD 
SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 417–18 (2d ed. 2007). Despite 
this difficulty, some generalizations can be made, and those generalizations have use for us.  
 184. Of course, some of an individual‘s taxes likely benefit that individual in some way. There is 
no link, however, between taxes paid and benefits received, and the view that benefits received 
justifies taxation is generally disfavored. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy 
Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 451–55 (1952). 
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The necessity of making value-based judgments with respect to 
distributive justice issues goes unquestioned in other areas of tax 
scholarship, such as in seminal works discussing the rate structure, 
consumption taxes, the estate tax, endowment taxation,
185
 and so on.
186
 
Because the charitable tax subsidies are part of an inherently redistributive 
tax system, it seems contradictory not to consider the redistributive effects 
of those subsidies when structuring them.
187
 This does not require tax 
scholars themselves to choose a single theory of distributive justice that 
provides the ―best‖ anchor for the charitable tax subsidies, but a 
consideration of distributive justice issues can help policymakers think 
more carefully about the subsidies.
188
 
Interestingly, some of the economic-subsidy scholars seem to 
acknowledge that the charitable tax subsidies inevitably raise 
distributional issues that should be addressed, but they gloss over these 
questions without adequately addressing them. For example, pluralists 
Levmore and Schizer each express concerns about the greater voice given 
to the wealthy,
189
 and efficiency-focused scholar Mark Gergen voices 
concern about the upside-down subsidy effect.
190
 Moreover, many of these 
scholars seem to endorse redistribution as desirable, but do not specify 
what they mean by redistribution or why they endorse it.
191
  
When the efficiency theorists do acknowledge distributive concerns in 
more detail, their analysis is insufficient. For example, efficiency-focused 
 
 
 185. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Inequality, Wealth, and Endowment, 53 TAX L. REV. 397 
(2000), and sources cited, supra notes 1–3. 
 186. In discussing the progressive rate structure, Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith argued 
that, ―[t]o determine the desirability of a tax structure, it is necessary to have a theory of distributive 
justice that determines whether, and how much, to weigh the particular consequences of that 
structure.‖ Bankman & Griffith, supra note 1, at 1910; see also McCaffery, supra note 2, at 830 
(―[F]airness is central to tax . . . . [T]he reason to have a tax system, especially an individuated tax 
system, is to finance the needs of the state in a fair and just manner.‖).  
 187. Griffith, supra note 53, at 394–95.  
[A] satisfactory theory of personal deductions must be grounded on appealing normative 
principles. 
 . . . Further research is needed to evaluate the tax implications of nonwelfarist principles 
and to examine welfarist taxation under more plausible assumptions. Such scholarship has 
substantially greater potential for advancing our understanding of the ideal system of personal 
deductions than research that leaves its normative assumptions unstated.  
Id. 
 188. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 53, at 385 (―Tax scholars have no special expertise in resolving 
the thorny problem of choosing among normative principles. They can, however, help analyze how 
alternative ethical principles might be reflected in a tax structure.‖). 
 189. Levmore, supra note 84, at 405–06, 417–18; Schizer, supra note 107, at 32–33. 
 190. Gergen, supra note 52, at 1405–06. 
 191. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 52, at 1434; Levmore, supra note 84, at 406; Schizer, supra 
note 107, at 5, 16. 
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Jeff Strnad criticizes the Lindahl equilibrium sought by Hochman and 
Rodgers on the grounds that it might not necessarily be neutral with 
respect to the distribution of the surplus generated by the subsidization of 
public goods.
192
 Strnad himself attempts to solve this problem by assuming 
that one‘s preference for subsidizing a given public good reflects one‘s 
views on the likely distribution of that good if subsidized.
193
 But by 
folding distributional questions into preferences, Strnad seems to be 
invoking a kind of preference-satisfaction version of distributive justice. 
(My point is not to criticize Strnad, for this is a fairly common move. 
Rather, my point is to emphasize the unavoidability of distributional 
questions.)  
Once we agree that work on the distributional issues raised by the 
charitable tax subsidies is a necessary complement to the efficiency- and 
pluralism-based scholarship,
194
 there are two ways of proceeding. First, we 
could analyze the implications of various distributive justice theories 
without attempting to distill any values other than efficiency and pluralism 
from the work of such scholars. In other words, we could skip the task of 
asking why these scholars care about efficiency and pluralism, and simply 
move on to the distributive justice questions.  
Although moving immediately to such questions implies distributional 
issues are somehow separate, or separable, from the values of efficiency 
and pluralism, it would still enhance our understanding of the tax subsidies 
beyond our current level. This can be useful regardless of whether we feel 
distributive justice is subordinate or prior to the values of efficiency and 
pluralism. For example, we could use distributive justice as a tool to help 
us identify which under-supplied public goods should be subsidized if 
 
 
 192. Strnad, supra note 87, at 271. 
 193. Id. at 268. 
 194. The case for looking at distributive justice is less strong if one subscribes to the base-
measurement theory, although two plausible reasons exist for so doing. First, even explaining the 
benefits‘ existence as a form of base-measurement does not answer the further question whether a 
departure from that base might be warranted on philosophical grounds. Take, for example, the 
measurement theories for the deduction. Bittker‘s moral obligation theory does not answer whether all 
donations discharge moral obligations of equal value. And even under Andrews‘s theory, perhaps 
some charitable transfers should not be deductible—even if they measure income accurately—much 
like a tax penalty. Think of Tank Truck, in which the Supreme Court held that fines paid by a trucking 
company for exceeding highway weight limits were not deductible as business expenses—even though 
they were incurred in the ordinary course of business—on public policy grounds. Tank Truck Rentals, 
Inc. v. Comm‘r, 356 U.S. 30, 36 (1958). If fines that are clearly a cost of doing business are not 
deductible, then maybe there is room for moral theory to suggest that some charitable transfers should 
not be deductible, even if we do not consider them consumption under Haig-Simons. Second, Andrews 
argues that the goals of the tax system should affect the choice of base. If one goal of the tax system is 
redistribution, then shouldn‘t the extent to which a charitable transfer redistributes matter? See, e.g., 
Griffith, supra note 53, at 368 (criticizing Andrews on this point).  
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forced to choose (thus subordinating distributive justice). Alternatively, 
we could view the efficiency- and pluralism-based works as delineating 
the best way of subsidizing activities that our notions of distributive justice 
have already deemed worthy of subsidizing.
195
 If, for example, our notion 
of distributive justice counsels us to assist ―the poor‖ and helps to define 
who is considered poor, then the pluralism and efficiency theories can help 
us determine the best way of structuring subsidies for activities that help 
the poor, thus prioritizing distributive justice. 
We could do even better, however. Instead, we could seek to unearth 
the values motivating the efficiency and pluralism scholars—that is, 
determine why one values efficiency and/or pluralism in the first instance. 
If we do so, it may be the case that the values motivating a particular 
scholar will be enhanced even more once distributive justice issues are 
explicitly considered. This might, for example, counsel us to make 
distinctions among potentially subsidizable activities in order to best 
further whatever underlying value efficiency or pluralism serves for a 
given scholar.  
Sometimes, identifying a theorist‘s normative underpinnings is simple: 
scholars occasionally explicitly state their normative motivations. Pluralist 
David Schizer, for example, is upfront about the fact that he adopts a 
welfarist framework.
196
 But even Schizer does not fully explore the 
implications of adopting this framework, for he does not sufficiently 
address whether differentiating among charitable activities might enhance 
welfare (Schizer flirts with this idea and then rejects it as being 
outweighed by the benefits of giving donors wider leeway to choose their 
projects).
197
 More often, however, scholars working in the economic-
subsidy area do not explicitly identify their normative underpinnings. 
Ironically, this is true even when these scholars explicitly flag 
distributional issues, such as the upside-down subsidy argument.
198
  
To begin, efficiency-based scholars are generally silent as to why they 
value efficiency (other than as a potential tool for avoiding messy value 
judgments). As Ed McCaffery has explored, one likely cares about 
efficiency for any of three reasons: welfarism, liberalism, and 
libertarianism.
199
 Of those three, it seems that welfarist concerns are 
 
 
 195. Hochman and Rodgers seem to take this approach. See Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 87, 
at 238.  
 196. Schizer, supra note 107, at 6–7.  
 197. Id. at 36–39.  
 198. See, e.g., Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 87 at 238–39; Levmore, supra note 84, at 405, 
417–18; Strnad, supra note 87, at 265–69. 
 199. See McCaffery, supra note 172, at 639–40 (asking why we care about efficiency).  
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motivating most of the efficiency-based scholarship on the charitable tax 
subsidies. A number of works, for example, use Paretian concepts of 
efficiency to argue that the charitable tax subsidies are desirable.
200
  
To illustrate, efficiency scholars Strnad, Hochman and Rodgers have 
all argued that the tax subsidies are desirable because they make high 
demanders (those who make voluntary contributions to a given activity) 
better off without making low demanders (those who do not voluntarily 
contribute but who pay involuntarily through the tax system) worse off.
201
 
This analysis assumes, however, that low demanders enjoy enough of a 
benefit from the subsidized projects to outweigh the decline in their 
welfare from increased taxes. In other words, it assumes that the low 
demanders would prefer a world with the subsidies over one without.  
This assumption is, not surprisingly, contested:
202
 it assumes that it is 
―fair‖ to force the low demanders to make involuntary payments. Some 
other efficiency scholars, such as Mark Gergen, attempt to resolve that 
dilemma and the justice-related issues it raises by invoking Kaldor-
Hicks.
203
 Under this standard of efficiency, the desirability of a policy is 
judged by whether the ―winners‖ collectively gain enough to 
(hypothetically) pay off the ―losers‖ and still be ahead (actual payment is 
not required, however).
204
 Individual gains (such as the concrete benefits 
enjoyed by the recipients of charitable goods and services and the 
intangible pleasure donors receiving from giving) and losses (for example, 
from the increased taxes imposed on low-demanders) are important only 
because they comprise the collective societal gains and losses. Gergen 
flags but does not address questions about the fairness of this standard (as 
opposed to the Paretian norms he rejects).
205
 Instead, he skips over the 
―ethical question whether it is right to take from one person to enrich 
others more‖ by simply noting that ―Kaldor-Hicks is a commonly accepted 
standard of efficiency.‖206 Even if this is true, it begs the question whether 
 
 
 200. Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 87, at 224–25 (Pareto optimality); Strnad, supra note 87, at 
266–67. Strnad disagrees, however, with Hochman and Rogers about whether a deduction or credit 
better effectuates this norm. Compare Strnad, supra note 87, at 272–76, with Hochman & Rodgers, 
supra note 87, at 236. See also McCaffery, supra note 172, at 636–39 (offering a succinct explanation 
of Pareto superiority).  
 201. Gergen, supra note 52, at 1401. 
 202. Compare Richard J. Arneson, The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems, 92 
ETHICS 616 passim (1982), with ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA, 93–95 (1974). See 
also Gergen, supra note 52, at 1401–02 n.27.  
 203. Gergen, supra note 52, at 1412. 
 204. See McCaffery, supra note 172, at 636–37. 
 205. Gergen, supra note 52, at 1413. 
 206. Id. 
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all Kaldor-Hicks moves are normatively desirable when all relevant 
considerations, including those of distributive justice, are brought to bear.  
As a number of scholars have pointed out, both Pareto and Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency are inherently welfarist
207
 because they look to individual 
well-being to determine the desirability of a given policy.
208
 Endorsing 
such standards reflects value judgments by (1) deciding that well-being 
matters, (2) defining well-being, and (3) determining how to aggregate 
well-being.
209
 Much of the efficiency scholarship, for example, seems to 
endorse utilitarian principles: Gergen often invokes utility and pleasure 
when applying Kaldor-Hicks;
210
 Strnad and Hochman and Rodgers all 
focus on preference satisfaction;
211
 and much of the work addressing 
whether the deduction should be replaced with a credit also seems to 
invoke utilitarian principles.
212
  
It seems, then, that the efficiency scholars have not, after all, avoided 
moral questions
213
 in their analysis of the charitable tax subsidies:
214
 
 
 
 207. I mean ―welfarist‖ in the sense that welfare economics is welfarist—that is, encompassing a 
variety of methods of using individual well-being to determine a policy‘s desirability. I do not use the 
term ―welfarist‖ in the sense of specifying one particular social welfare function.  
 208. HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 172, at 64–65, 144–45, 217; KAPLOW & SHAVELL, 
supra note 172, at 56. 
 209. See HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 172, at 97–155; KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 
172, at 16, 25–27 (―[A] method of aggregation is of necessity an element of welfare economics, and 
value judgments are involved in aggregating different individuals‘ well-being into a single measure of 
social welfare. The choice of a method of aggregation involves the adoption of a view concerning 
matters of distribution . . .‖) (footnotes omitted).  
 210. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 52, at 1407, 1412–13, 1425. According to McCaffery, this type 
of move ―collapses Kaldor-Hicks efficiency into utilitarianism,‖ which to him ―misses the point of the 
Kaldor-Hicks test, which is to avoid interpersonal utility comparisons.‖ McCaffery, supra note 172, at 
641. Whether McCaffery‘s accusation is true, however, is beside the point for purposes of this Article. 
Even if something other than utilitarianism is motivating the use of Kaldor-Hicks, something is 
motivating its use, and that something has distributive justice implications.  
 211. Hochman & Rogers, supra note 87; Strnad, supra note 87.  
 212. This is so because those who criticize the deduction for undermining the progressive rate 
structure, see, e.g., McDaniel, supra note 64, are implicitly criticizing it for violating utilitarian 
principles. And by responding that the deduction increases progressivity ―by transferring funds from 
rich taxpayers to those in more moderate circumstances,‖ scholars like Bittker are implicitly defending 
the structure on utilitarian grounds. Bittker, supra note 55, at 55. To be sure, one might favor 
redistribution from rich to poor for non-utilitarian reasons. See infra Part IV. But by grounding these 
arguments specifically in progressivity, they are implicitly making a utilitarian argument for 
redistribution. 
 213. As described in the text accompanying notes 131–36, supra, a variety of reasons may explain 
why the efficiency scholars hope to avoid moral questions about what should be subsidized: it is quite 
likely that they feel such questions are important but that they themselves have little to say on the 
subject, or perhaps they have individual thoughts on a ―just‖ distribution of income but believe that 
public policy should remain agnostic for political economy reasons. Or, perhaps, some truly believe 
that moral questions about the worth of various charities can be avoided. Regardless, much current 
legal work on the tax subsidies interprets the efficiency-based scholars as hoping to avoid such 
questions, and this Article‘s analysis proceeds from that characterization (while acknowledging that 
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adopting a welfarist framework for the evaluation of tax policy is not 
value-neutral. Within the consequentialist tradition itself, for example, 
many theorists reject preference-satisfaction as a measure of well-being. 
Moreover, welfare-based theories are themselves substantive theories of 
value: adopting them entails rejecting the values prized by theories outside 
of the consequentialist tradition, such as deontological and aretaic theories 
(which reject the notion that efficiency is a proper standard for the 
evaluation of public policy).
215
  
For the most part, welfarist standards also seem to implicitly motivate 
the pluralism and donative scholars (Schizer even makes this explicit).
216
 
For example, Levmore‘s ―taxes-as-ballots‖ idea focuses on the advantages 
of using the charitable deduction as a means of measuring and aggregating 
citizens‘ preferences.217 Hall and Colombo (of the donative theory) 
similarly argue that voluntary donations to given projects should 
determine deservedness,
218
 thus implying that the revealed preferences of 
donors are what determine well-being. Lastly, Schizer‘s concern about 
giving the wealthy a greater voice in determining which projects receive 
funding reflects a fear that the preferences of the wealthy ―may not 
adequately represent the preferences of society as a whole.‖219 This 
implies that aggregate preference satisfaction enhances well-being, which 
is, of course, welfarist.
220
  
 
 
the efficiency scholars may not be as hostile to value judgments as they have been interpreted as 
being).  
 214. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 172, at 25–26. 
 In several different respects, the approach of welfare economics involves value 
judgments. First, value judgments underlie the assumptions that social welfare depends on 
individuals‘ well-being, that this dependence is positive, and that factors unrelated to 
individuals‘ well-being are irrelevant. In other words, to adopt welfare economics is to adopt 
the moral position that one should be concerned, positively and exclusively, with individuals‘ 
well-being. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 215. See Parts IV.C and IV.D for brief descriptions of such theories.  
 216. Schizer, supra note 107, at 6–7. As with the efficiency scholars, the pluralist scholars may 
have a variety of reasons for hoping to avoid judgments about the moral worth of activities being 
subsidized, including (particularly) a desire for agnosticism for political economy reasons.  
 217. Levmore, supra note 84, at 388–89, 411–12. Further, Levmore also seems to imply that 
informed preferences are what matters, by suggesting that voters might take their votes more seriously 
if they have to pay for them in part. Id. at 411. 
 218. See Part II.B.2.c. 
 219. Schizer, supra note 107, at 32.  
 220. Ironically, this both is and is not pluralist. In one sense, it is pluralist, for it accounts for the 
plurality of preferences. In another sense, however, using preference-satisfaction as the standard of 
value is the opposite of pluralism: preference-satisfaction-based welfarism is only one of many 
theories of the good in our pluralistic country, and privileging that theory while ignoring others 
actually undermines the value of pluralism in this second sense. 
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To be clear, my goal here is not to ―out‖ these scholars as not really 
being pluralists, or as being secret utilitarians, or what have you. It could 
be the case, for example, that these scholars care about wealth 
maximization on welfarist grounds other than utilitarianism,
221
 or even on 
deontological grounds.
222
 And it is also quite plausible that the pluralism 
scholars can normatively justify caring about pluralism on equality or 
other grounds. And in fact, some of the scholars who appear to be 
welfarist at times also seem to care about egalitarianism. For example, 
Levmore, Schizer, and Strnad object to the upside-down subsidy effect on 
the grounds that it violates the one-person, one-vote principle.
223
  
The point, however, is to emphasize the necessity of looking at 
distributive justice in addition to pluralism and efficiency.
224
 If such 
scholars care about those values on, say, utilitarian grounds, why invoke 
utilitarianism only to justify the existence and general structure of the tax 
subsidies? Why not also explore what utilitarianism might mean for the 
content of the subsidies: that is, which activities are eligible for subsidies, 
and should all activities receive the same amount of subsidy? It might be 
the case, for example, that some activities are more utility-enhancing than 
others and therefore should be favored. Further, it might be the case that 
the activities we wish to subsidize differ depending on how one defines 
utility: Wealth? Happiness? Preference satisfaction?
225
 Lastly, it may be 
the case that the pluralism- and efficiency-enhancing aspects of the 
nonprofit sector are so strong that any adverse distributional consequences 
stemming from the current structure are ―worth it.‖226 But we do not know 
whether there are any such consequences, or whether they can be 
overlooked, without a better understanding of how distributive justice and 
the charitable sector interact.  
 
 
 221. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 172, at 5 n.8; Bankman & Griffith, supra note 1, at 
1913 (stating ―the concept of economic efficiency carries normative force only when tied to the 
welfare of individuals.‖).  
 222. See McCaffery, supra note 172, at 643–48. 
 223. See supra Part II.B.2.  
 224. Of course, I recognize that folding distributive justice questions into the equation is a difficult 
task. First, as a number of scholars have recognized, identifying precisely who benefits from non-profit 
activity can be difficult. SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 183, at 417–18; Clotfelter, supra note 
6, at 9–10. Second, fully considering the distributive justice implications of subsidizing charities 
requires a counterfactual: identifying the distribution in the absence of subsidized charities, which is 
almost impossible to do. Clotfelter supra note 6, at 12. And lastly, importing the insights that 
distributive justice might shed into the public policy arena may be quite difficult as a political matter.  
 225. See KYMLICKA, supra note 150, at 13–20 (discussing the most common definitions of 
utility). 
 226. See, e.g., Henry Hansman, Nonprofit Enterprise in the Performing Arts, 12 BELL J. OF ECON. 
341 (1981). 
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C. Scholarship Which Does Explicitly Address Distributive Justice Issues 
Is Too Shallow  
A second reason for analyzing the relationship between distributive 
justice and charity in more detail is that it enables us to better respond to 
the many critiques of the charitable subsidies that raise distributive justice 
issues.
227
 One school of criticism focuses on the distributional aspects of 
the projects funded by the subsidies, suggesting that current subsidies do 
not do enough to further distributive justice. Stanford political science 
Professor Rob Reich, for example, has argued that instead of promoting 
equality of opportunity, the charitable deduction does exactly the 
opposite.
228
 He maintains that charitable dollars disproportionately benefit 
the already-better-off in society, thus widening the gap in opportunity 
between the better- and worse-off.
229
 Think, for example, of charitable 
dollars flowing to schools: most go to private schools with generally 
wealthier students or to support public schools in well-off areas, thus 
increasing the head-start of these students over poorer students.
230
  
Similarly, Teresa Odendahl has criticized much current giving for 
mainly benefiting the already-privileged in society.
231
 She focuses on the 
giving patterns of the very wealthy, which tend to favor elite colleges and 
universities and cultural institutions like museums and operas.
232
 In her 
 
 
 227. Although this Part focuses on scholarly critiques of the charitable tax subsidies, many 
debates in the media and the political arena echo these points. Congress, for example, has recently held 
several hearings to determine whether nonprofit hospitals should be required to provide free or 
reduced cost care to the poor; as of summer 2009, this requirement had found its way into discussions 
of President Obama‘s health care reform initiatives. John D. Colombo, The Role of Redistribution to 
the Poor in Federal Tax Exemption, Nat‘l Ctr. on Philanthropy & the Law Annual Conference 10 (Oct. 
29, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Former Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich (not 
to be confused with Stanford professor Rob Reich), has also invoked distributive justice considerations 
in discussing the charitable tax subsidies, arguing that donations to organizations helping the poor 
should receive more favorable treatment than contributions to other organizations. Robert B. Reich, 
Op-Ed., Is Harvard Really a Charity?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007, available at http://articles.latimes. 
com/2007/oct/01/news/oe-reich1. ―If the donation goes to an institution or agency set up to help the 
poor, the donor gets a full deduction. If the donation goes somewhere else—to an art palace, a 
university, a symphony or any other nonprofit—the donor gets to deduct only half of the contribution.‖ 
Id. In addition, the public debate over university endowments also echoes these concerns. Colombo, 
supra, at 13–14.  
 228. Rob Reich, Philanthropy and Its Uneasy Relation to Equality, in TAKING PHILANTHROPY 
SERIOUSLY: BEYOND NOBLE INTENTIONS TO RESPONSIBLE GIVING 27–49 (William Damon & Susan 
Verducci eds., 2007). 
 229. Id.  
 230. Id.  
 231. TERESA ODENDAHL, CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME: GENEROSITY AND SELF-INTEREST AMONG 
THE PHILANTHROPIC ELITE 3 (1990). 
 232. Id.  
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view, most such giving simply augments the social status of the already 
well-to-do in society and does little to help the poor.
233
 This pattern 
bothers Odendahl on two levels: first, because of the lack of resource 
redistribution to the non-wealthy, and second, because she believes this 
pattern augments power already held by the wealthy.
234
  
Odendahl‘s latter concern is akin to another common criticism of the 
charitable tax subsidies: that their structure disproportionately benefits 
upper-income taxpayers due to their ―upside-down‖ nature.235 Take the 
charitable deduction. Because deductions reduce taxable income, they are 
more valuable to higher-bracket taxpayers than lower-bracket taxpayers. 
To illustrate, a taxpayer in the 35% bracket saves thirty-five dollars from a 
one hundred dollar reduction in taxable income, while a taxpayer in the 
15% bracket would save only fifteen dollars. Put another way, a taxpayer 
in the 35% bracket receives a thirty-five dollar subsidy from a one hundred 
dollar charitable deduction while a taxpayer in the 15% bracket receives a 
subsidy of only fifteen dollars. Some scholars argue that this is troubling 
because it allows higher-bracket taxpayers to control more subsidy dollars, 
giving them a disproportionate influence over public policy.
236
 Other 
scholars are troubled by the distributional impact of the dollar value of the 
tax benefits
237
 received by upper-bracket taxpayers as compared to lower-
bracket individuals.
238
  
At first glance, the arguments of Reich, Odendahl, and the critics of the 
upside-down subsidy are appealing. They have deep historical roots.
239
 
They correspond to the common layperson‘s notion of charity as aid to the 
poor.
240
 And they complement the prior generation of scholarship on the 
charitable tax subsidies,
241
 while highlighting the omissions in more recent 
 
 
 233. Id. at 4–5, 11.  
 234. Id. at 3–4, 9, 11; see also Simon, supra note 6, at 56–61, 66–85 (acknowledging that the 
charitable deduction grants more decision-making power to the wealthy but nevertheless concluding 
that it is fair). 
 235. See, e.g., COMM‘N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, GIVING IN AMERICA: 
TOWARD A STRONGER VOLUNTARY SECTOR 109 (1975) [hereinafter COMM‘N REPORT]; STANLEY S. 
SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 21–22, 36 (1975); Gergen, supra note 52, at 1405; Kelman, 
supra note 53, at 833 n.7, 856–58; McDaniel, supra note 64, at 383. But see Griffith, supra note 53, at 
363; Strnad, supra note 87, at 268–69.  
 236. See Levmore, supra note 84, at 405–06; McDaniel, supra note 64, at 391; Schizer, supra note 
107, at 32–33. 
 237. That is, the value of a given exemption or deduction. 
 238. See, e.g., COMM‘N REPORT, supra note 235, at 108; Kelman, supra note 53, at 858. 
 239. See supra Part II. 
 240. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT HEARING, supra note 8, at 61–68 (2005) (stating ―the ordinary 
sense of the term [charity] . . . generally means the relief of the poor and distressed.‖). 
 241. See supra text accompanying notes 63–66.  
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scholarship
242
 and the confusion in current law.
243
 That said, a better sense 
of what the various accounts of distributive justice suggest for the 
charitable tax subsidies is necessary to fully assess these critiques.  
Take the upside-down subsidy claim, for example. Discomfort with 
allocating larger tax benefits to higher-bracket taxpayers must stem from 
some sense of what a ―fair‖ distribution of tax benefits and burdens is. The 
same is true of the argument that the tax subsidies unfairly give the 
wealthy a disproportionate say in public policy. Does this criticism stem 
from an egalitarian concern about what constitutes a ―fair‖ distribution of 
power?
244
 Or does it come from a concern that the voices of the wealthy 
do not represent the preferences of the whole?
245
 It is unclear, therefore, 
exactly which conception of distributive justice those who levy this 
criticism are building upon, and this critique might carry more or less 
weight depending on which conception of justice is used to judge the 
subsidies. To that end, critics of the charitable deduction would be well-
served to spell out more explicitly their conceptions of fairness.  
The same holds true for defenders of the deduction; existing responses 
to the upside-down subsidy claim can be enhanced by a more detailed 
exploration of distributive justice.
246
 As previous scholars have accurately 
noted, the true extent of these upside-down effects cannot be judged 
without factoring in potential benefits received by non-itemizers and 
lower-bracket taxpayers as recipients of charitable goods and services.
247
 
For example, Boris Bittker has posited that regardless of the upside-down 
effect, the overall effect of the deduction is to promote voluntary 
redistribution.
248
 John Simon has similarly argued, with respect to the 
estate tax charitable deduction, that ―it is doubtful that the charitable 
deduction results in a less egalitarian distributional pattern than . . . in a 
world without deductions‖ and that the less advantaged benefit from the 
intangible benefits of a vibrant non-profit sector (such as increased 
flexibility and experimentation and the diffusion of power).
249
 Simon then 
 
 
 242. See supra Part III.A. 
 243. See supra Part III.D.  
 244. See Simon, supra note 6, at 26 (linking the upside-down subsidy with the dispersion of power 
in an inegalitarian manner).  
 245. See, e.g., Simon et al., supra note 7, at 279 (noting that current scholarship raises both as 
possible causes of concern). 
 246. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 53, at 354–63 (discussing additional ways of assessing the 
distributional impact of tax expenditures and whether the ―upside down subsidy‖ argument has merit).  
 247. Bittker, supra note 55, at 55–56. 
 248. Id. at 55–56. 
 249. Simon, supra note 6, at 33, 78.  
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concludes that the charitable tax subsidies therefore do not implicate equal 
opportunity concerns.
250
  
Bittker‘s response concerning voluntary redistribution and Simon‘s 
reply concerning egalitarianism, however, are incomplete without a more 
nuanced understanding of what is meant by ―redistribution‖ and 
―egalitarianism.‖ Simon‘s article, for example, extensively discusses the 
question of whether the charitable tax subsidies violate equality norms by 
using a four-part test inspired by Rawls‘s difference principle.251 While 
this is likely the most nuanced discussion to date of the interplay between 
the charitable tax subsidies and distributive justice theory, it discusses but 
one such theory. It may be the case, therefore, that both Simon‘s and 
Bittker‘s responses adequately address the upside-down subsidy argument 
under some versions of distributive justice but not others.  
The same holds true for the arguments of Reich and Odendahl; one 
cannot fully assess their criticisms without understanding the range of 
accounts of equality and justifications for helping the poor. What does it 
mean to be ―poor‖ or ―disadvantaged‖? Should we consider only one‘s 
material assets, or other factors as well? If the latter, which additional 
aspects? If our goal is to enhance equality, what, exactly, are we trying to 
equalize? Should all transfers benefiting the poor be treated the same way? 
Does simply giving a materially disadvantaged unemployed person food, 
clothing, or money assist him in the same manner as teaching job skills so 
that he can earn his own keep? 
These questions illustrate that even if we assume that the purpose of 
charity is to help the poor, without a more grounded notion of who is 
―poor‖ and ―disadvantaged‖ and what our duties to such persons are, we 
cannot determine what charitable activities should be encouraged in our 
society. For example, it may be the case that the current subsidies are too 
narrow under some views of equality and too broad under others. 
Alternatively, perhaps other interpretations of equality or helping the poor 
countenance a broad definition of charity similar to the current one. 
Moreover, these criticisms assume that the redistribution of resources 
resulting from the charitable tax allowances is justified only if the poor 
(however defined) are benefited or equality is enhanced. It may be the 
case, however, that some theories of distributive justice justify charitable 
subsidies on other grounds. Thus, we cannot satisfactorily address justice-
based criticisms of the charitable tax subsidies without a more detailed 
 
 
 250. Id. at 30–33. 
 251. Id. at 56–84. 
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exploration of the interaction between distributive justice and those 
subsidies. 
D. The Law Governing the Charitable Tax Subsidies Is Confused 
Given the lack of theoretical guidance about what activities should 
qualify for the charitable tax subsidies, it is not surprising that the law 
governing those subsidies is a bit schizophrenic when it comes to 
distributive justice issues. Namely, there seems to be no rhyme or reason 
concerning whether or not a given organization must somehow serve the 
poor in order to qualify,
252
 and there is little concrete guidance as to the 
reason for subsidizing groups that do not help the poor.
253
  
Quite generally, to qualify for the charitable tax subsidies under 
Sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code, an organization must be formed 
for ―religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes.‖254 
The term ―charitable purposes‖ has been broadly interpreted to include not 
only aid to the poor, but also a wide variety of additional goals deemed to 
have a ―community benefit.‖255 A few such goals include, for example, 
 
 
 252. In contrast, the United Kingdom recently added a requirement to its charitable laws that 
organizations may not exclude those who are less well off from benefiting from the organization‘s 
activities. CHARITY COMM‘N, CHARITIES AND PUBLIC BENEFIT: THE CHARITY COMMISSION‘S 
GENERAL GUIDANCE ON PUBLIC BENEFIT 22–27 (2008) (guidance from the U.K.‘s Charity 
Commission concerning the requirement in Part 1 § 3 of the 2006 U.K. Charities Act that charities 
offer a ―public benefit‖).  
 253. See generally FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 29, at 101–218; Simon et al., supra note 7, 
at 277–78 (discussing Congress‘s inconsistency in requiring some institutions but not others to help 
the poor in order to qualify for the charitable tax subsidies); Colombo, supra note 227, at 4–13 
(discussing the changing standards used by courts and the IRS to determine qualification for tax 
exemption). Scholars have lamented this fact for years, searching in vain for a way to make sense of 
the doctrinal mess created by Treasury, the IRS, and the courts. See, e.g., John D. Colombo, The Role 
of Access in Charitable Tax Exemption, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 343, 343 (2004). Recently, Congress has 
also taken an interest in the problem. See Tax-Exempt Charitable Organizations: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 254. I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(B) and 501(c)(3) (2006). Although the statutory language seems to 
differentiate between the specifically enumerated purposes (e.g., religious, educational, or scientific, 
and the like) and the catch-all ―charitable purpose,‖ the Supreme Court has held that the common-law 
standards of charity apply to all organizations seeking to qualify for the charitable tax subsidies. Bob 
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598–99 (1983). Thus, religious and educational 
organizations, for example, are not per se exempt; rather, they must be charitable religious or 
educational organizations.  
 255. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)—1(d)(2) (as amended in 2008); HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
HEARING, supra note 8, at 63. Although the colloquial meaning of the word ―charitable‖ generally 
relates to helping the poor, the legal definition, which stems from charitable trust law, is much broader. 
See HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT HEARING, supra note 8, at 61–68.  
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preserving the environment, providing cause-oriented public interest 
litigation, furthering public health, supporting the arts, and so on.
256
  
In large part, the Code and regulations determine which organizations 
provide the requisite community benefit indirectly, via the requirement of 
an appropriately indeterminate charitable class of beneficiaries
257
 and the 
prohibitions against quid pro quos,
258
 commerciality,
259
 private benefit,
260
 
and private inurement.
261
 These rules (which also apply to organizations 
qualifying under the enumerated purposes) therefore work in the negative: 
the idea seems to be that by attempting to ensure that if an organization 
does not benefit specific individuals or act ―too much‖ like a for-profit 
commercial enterprise, then the organization must be doing something 
good for the community at large.  
As numerous scholars have lamented, not only are these rules 
extraordinarily vague and underdeveloped, but the very act of defining the 
good by prohibiting the bad creates a number of problems.
262
 Simply 
because an organization is undertaking activities that do not benefit 
specific individuals does not mean that those activities necessarily benefit 
the community at large. The rules, therefore, may be necessary for 
defining whether certain activities deserve subsidies, but they are not 
sufficient.  
More specifically, confusion arises because it is unclear precisely what 
constitutes the community benefit required of groups formed for 
―charitable purposes‖ and whether such groups must offer any type of 
assistance to the less-fortunate. In contrast, it is well settled that groups 
formed for enumerated purposes do not need to assist the needy to qualify 
for the subsidies, although there is no coherent explanation for this 
 
 
 256. See HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT HEARING, supra note 8, at 64; FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra 
note 29, at 105–43, 357–62. 
 257. The requirement of a charitable class (which is not explicitly identified as such in the Code or 
regulations) stems from the idea that if an organization is formed to benefit specifically identified 
individuals or a group that is ―too small,‖ then it is not doing something beneficial for the community 
at large. See HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT HEARING, supra note 8, at 63; BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW 
OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 180–81 (9th ed. 2007). 
 258. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h) (as amended in 1996). 
 259. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) (as amended in 2008). See HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
HEARING, supra note 8, at 51. 
 260. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2008). See HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
HEARING, supra note 8, at 55–56. 
 261. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (in order to qualify for tax exemption, ―no part of the net earnings 
. . . [can] inure[ ]to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual‖); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(c)(2) (as amended in 2008); HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT HEARING, supra note 8, at 54–55. 
 262. See, e.g., John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063 (2006).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss3/2
  
 
 
 
 
2010] THEORIZING THE CHARITABLE TAX SUBSIDIES 555 
 
 
 
 
either.
263
 Moreover, this is true even though the Supreme Court has held 
that common-law standards of charity apply to the latter as well as to the 
former.
264
 Thus, not only is there confusion as to whether groups 
qualifying under the ―charitable purpose‖ prong must benefit the poor, but 
also as to why ―charitable‖ seems to be interpreted one way for the 
―charitable purpose‖ requirement but another way when applied as a 
requirement for the specifically enumerated purposes.
265
  
To give but a few examples, hospitals need not offer any free or 
reduced-cost services to the poor, on the grounds that promoting the health 
of the community is a benefit.
266
 Modern IRS rulings and court opinions, 
however, seem to make free care for the poor a virtual requirement of 
exemption for other health organizations (such as HMOs and 
pharmacies).
267
 Similarly, art galleries and community theaters need not 
reduce fees to the poor in order to qualify,
268
 yet groups that provide other 
recreational facilities for adults (such as health clubs) are generally 
required to do so.
269
 At least in one instance, however, an ice skating rink 
attained tax-exempt status with nothing more than vague plans to offer 
some sort of program for disadvantaged children.
270
 In that case, the IRS 
held that simply providing recreation on a non-discriminatory basis 
promoted social welfare and therefore qualified for the subsidies.
271
  
This confusion also exists with respect to groups providing more 
tangible financial assistance to beneficiaries. An organization that 
provided merit-based pay and college loan reimbursements to police 
officers qualified for the subsidies without being required to tie those 
 
 
 263. See Colombo, supra note 253, at 343. 
 264. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1982).  
 265. For a very readable account of the doctrinal confusion, see Colombo, supra note 227.  
 266. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (hospitals can still qualify for tax exemption without 
offering inpatient care to indigent patients if they offer an open emergency room); Rev. Rul. 83-157, 
1983-2 C.B. 94 (specialized hospitals without emergency rooms offering no free or reduced cost 
services to indigent patients may qualify for tax exemption). That said, a number of states have started 
to challenge whether hospitals that do not offer free or reduced cost services to the poor are eligible for 
state property-tax exemptions. See, e.g., Provena Covenant Med. Ctr. v. Dep‘t of Revenue, 894 N.E.2d 
452 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Debra Pressy, Provena Covenant to Have its Tax Exemption Case Heard, 
CHAMPAIGN NEWS-GAZETTE, Aug. 31, 2009. Thus, state law would also be aided by a more explicit 
consideration of distributive justice issues.  
 267. See, e.g., IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm‘r, 325 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2003); Fed‘n 
Pharmacy Serv., Inc. v. Comm‘r, 625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980), aff’g, 72 T.C. 687 (1979) (denying 
exemption to a pharmacy that sold drugs and other items at cost to the poor and elderly); John D. 
Colombo, The Failure of Community Benefit, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 29, 30–37 (2005).  
 268. Goldsboro Art League v. Comm‘r, 75 T.C. 337 (1980). 
 269. See Colombo, supra note 253, at 358–60, 384.  
 270. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 05-32-058 (May 18, 2005). 
 271. Id. 
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particular programs to need.
272
 In contrast, a somewhat similar 
organization that provided housing down payment assistance was denied 
qualification on the grounds that it assisted anyone qualifying for an FHA 
or HUD loan, with no additional income criteria.
273
 Groups that provide 
various forms of community-development-oriented housing assistance 
must either serve the poor or members of minority groups in order to 
qualify.
274
 Simply assisting middle-class families, even if those families 
would be otherwise unable to find housing in a given area, is not enough 
(unless those families are racial minorities or the neighborhood is in 
decay).
275
  
The problems created by this confusion became particularly acute in 
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, when over a 
billion dollars flowed to disaster relief groups such as the Red Cross and 
the Twin Towers Fund. Traditionally, such groups were required to 
identify and assist only victims in dire financial need. As a result, the 
Service initially balked when such groups announced plans to assist the 
families of all victims, whether financially needy or not. After some 
outcry, however, the Service relented and allowed distributions to the non-
needy if made ―in good faith using objective standards.‖276  
Given the vast resources Americans spend on charity, the confusion 
identified above is untenable. In order to better spend our charitable 
dollars on activities ―beneficial‖ to society, we need a more coherent 
notion of what is considered ―beneficial.‖ As previously discussed, this 
cannot be done without considering distributive justice in addition to 
pluralism and efficiency. Using distributive justice as a tool, therefore, has 
practical, in addition to theoretical, benefits.
277
  
 
 
 272. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 08-19-023 (Feb. 14, 2008). 
 273. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 08-21-038 (Feb. 28, 2008). 
 274. Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115. 
 275. Id. 
 276. I.R.S. Notice 2001-78, 2001-50 I.R.B. 576; FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 29, at 143–47; 
see also David Barstow & Diana B. Henriques, I.R.S. Makes an Exception on Terror Aid, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 17, 2001, at B1; David Barstow & Diana B. Henriques, Victims’ Funds May Violate U.S. Tax 
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at B1. 
 277. See, e.g., Simon et al., supra note 7, at 278. It may also be the case that explicitly considering 
distributive justice can help us better assess the desirability of, or best structure for, certain rules 
currently governing subsidized organizations, such as the prohibitions against lobbying and political 
activities, the private benefit rule, and the unrelated business income tax.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss3/2
  
 
 
 
 
2010] THEORIZING THE CHARITABLE TAX SUBSIDIES 557 
 
 
 
 
IV. A PREVIEW OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF USING DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AS 
AN ADDITIONAL TOOL 
The foregoing parts have argued that we would be well-served to use 
distributive justice—in addition to the tools of efficiency and pluralism—
in our assessments of the charitable tax subsidies. Although the rest of this 
Series shall explore in depth the effects of doing so, a short preview of 
some of these potential implications may be beneficial at this point. To 
that end, this Part will briefly explore some consequences of applying 
those theories of distributive justice most commonly invoked in 
discussions of tax policy: utilitarianism, the maximin principle, the 
capabilities approach, and resource egalitarianism.
278
 In so doing, this Part 
will highlight some of the ways distributive justice can enhance our 
understanding of the subsidies: in some cases, a given theory might justify 
a structure similar to the current one, and thus help us respond to the 
critics of the subsidies. In other cases, a theory might narrow, or broaden, 
the scope of what we consider charitable (or simultaneously do both). And 
in some instances, explicitly identifying our normative theory can help 
elucidate whether a given activity must help the financially disadvantaged 
to merit a subsidy.  
A. Utilitarianism 
Although utilitarianism
279
 has fallen into disrepute in other areas,
280
 it 
exerts a strong influence on current tax policy
281
 and its progressive 
 
 
 278. Of course, each of these broad strands of distributive justice has many variations. As a mere 
consumer of philosophy (and not as an actual philosopher), I do not intend to critique or defend these 
theories. Nor can I address each possible variation of these theories, though numerous sub-strands 
have scholarly support in the philosophical literature. Instead, by focusing on the essentials of those 
theories with the most scholarly support in this Series, I hope to start a conversation about how to 
integrate a more nuanced view of distributive justice into our discussions of charitable giving.  
 279. KYMLICKA, supra note 150, at 10; MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 150, at 51; RAWLS, supra 
note 41, at 20. Readers familiar with the philosophical debates concerning utilitarianism will, of 
course, know that no single definition of utility exists in the philosophical literature. See, e.g., 
HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 172, at 100–01; KYMLICKA, supra note 150, at 13–20. This 
spurs many scholars to ignore, for public policy purposes, subjective measures of utility (such as 
individual preferences) and to instead focus on objective measures (such as the distribution of goods 
and evils that influence happiness). MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 150, at 52–53. For example, two 
such measures are liberty and money, which are considered useful regardless of one‘s specific 
preferences, because they enable people to satisfy their individual preferences, whatever those may be. 
KYMLICKA, supra note 150, at 19–20. 
 280. McCaffery, supra note 172, at 643 n.167. 
 281. See, e.g., Richard A. Musgrave, Equity and the Case for Progressive Taxation, in TAX 
JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE 9, 14 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002); Nancy 
C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REV. 919, 939–49 (1997) 
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nature.
282
 As applied to tax policy, theorists use it to argue that the best tax 
system redistributes income from those with ―more‖ in order to help those 
with ―less‖.283 The initial take on utilitarianism and charitable giving is 
that any giving that redistributes from the wealthy to the less-wealthy is 
consistent with utilitarian principles.
284
 Most likely, this would require 
identifying organizations that, as a general matter, effectuate downward 
redistribution. This would justify subsidizing organizations such as 
museums, theaters, and universities, where many attendees (even if middle 
or upper-middle class) are less wealthy than the benefactors.
285
 Here, 
explicitly identifying one‘s baseline theory of distributive justice helps to 
better evaluate existing arguments that such groups should not be 
subsidized because they do not ―help the poor.‖286  
Using utilitarianism as our baseline would also render charitable 
certain activities that are not considered charitable under current law, and 
vice versa. For example, current law does not consider financial 
redistribution to the non-poor to be charitable unless some other non-
financial benefit is also created,
287
 and controversy surrounds whether and 
to what extent the poor must be given free or reduced-cost services in 
 
 
(stating ―utilitarianism has been the primary ethical foundation of the tax laws throughout the 
twentieth century . . . .‖). 
 282. That is, a rate structure in which a higher rate of tax applies to the last dollar earned by a 
taxpayer than to her first dollar. For example, in 2009, someone‘s first dollar of taxable income is 
taxed at a rate of 10%, while one‘s last dollar can be taxed at rates as high as 35%.  
 283. The traditional application of utilitarian theory to tax policy makes three assumptions. The 
first is that measuring income or wealth is the best proxy for measuring utility. The second assumption 
is the declining marginal utility of resources (the theory that each additional dollar an individual has is 
worth subjectively less than the previous dollar). As applied to a given individual, this suggests that an 
extra dollar is subjectively more valuable to someone with an income of $10,000 than to someone with 
an income of $100,000. The final assumption is that all individuals have identical utility curves (that 
is, all individuals with an income of $10,000 value their 10,001st dollar equally; all individuals with an 
income of $100,000 value their 100,001st dollar equally, and so on). Bankman & Griffith, supra note 
1, at 1946–47. 
 284. To implement this as precisely as possible, however, would require identifying with some 
precision who should be considered benefactors versus beneficiaries of said redistribution, 
SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 183, at 417–18, as well as determining their relative income 
levels. But, what if we used the idea of downward redistribution as a general guide, without requiring 
technically-perfect compliance? What might that suggest? 
 285. See generally Clotfelter, supra note 6 (collecting empirical studies examining the 
distributional aspects of non-profits in the health services, education, religious organizations, social 
services, and arts and culture subsectors). 
 286. See supra Part III.C. 
 287. For example, groups that subsidize housing for the middle class in expensive neighborhoods 
do not qualify for the charitable tax exemption. Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B.115, in FISHMAN & 
SCHWARZ, supra note 29, at 136–37. Such groups can, however, qualify if they improve racial 
diversity in those neighborhoods. Id. at 135–36. And until clarification after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, it was unclear whether material assistance to the non-poor in the form of disaster relief 
was considered charitable. Id. at 143–47. 
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other contexts (such as health care and recreation centers).
288
 Under a 
utilitarian-centered theory of charitable giving, those questions would be 
resolved: so long as subsidizing a given activity results in downward 
income redistribution, it does not matter where along the income spectrum 
that redistribution occurs. On the other hand, focusing on downward 
redistribution would also mean that organizations whose benefactors are of 
roughly the same income class as their beneficiaries would not be 
subsidized. This would have the greatest impact in the case of churches 
and other houses of worship,
289
 and might also impact some social service 
organizations.
290
 Using utilitarianism to delineate the contours of the 
charitable tax subsidies would thus result in a different set of subsidies 
than under current law. Without more information on the distributional 
aspects of various charities, however, those contours remain unclear.
291
 
Utilitarianism could lead to potentially greater changes if we rejected 
using wealth as a proxy for utility and instead defined utility as happiness. 
Recently, a growing body of work has attempted to help us better 
understand happiness by identifying a number of attributes associated with 
happiness.
292
 The implications of these insights on the interaction of 
utilitarianism and charitable giving also merit attention. For example, 
much work has found a link between religion and happiness, which 
suggests that subsidizing churches and other places of worship that 
promote the practice of religion would be beneficial.
293
 While this is not a 
 
 
 288. See supra Part III.D. 
 289. Much evidence suggests, for example, that churches are highly segregated by income. This 
implies that most redistribution within churches is ―horizontal‖ instead of vertically downward, which 
would not increase utility in the sense discussed above. 
 290. This is so because evidence suggests that donative support for these groups tends to increase 
as one‘s income decreases. Gerald E. Auten, Charles T. Clotfelter, & Richard L. Schmalbeck, Taxes 
and Philanthropy Among the Wealthy 403–06 in Does Atlas Shrug? at 392 (Joel B. Slemrod, ed.) 
(2000). We can imagine, for example, a youth baseball team in a lower-middle-class area where 
donors to the team are financially comparable to the families whose children play on the team. Under a 
redistribution-focused application of utilitarianism, this would no longer merit a subsidy. To that end, 
most mutual non-profits would lose their tax exemption, since the mutual status implies the donors are 
the same as the beneficiaries.  
 291. Although such information is somewhat scarce at the moment, it can be obtained (as 
demonstrated by the work compiled by Charles Clotfleter in the 1980s). See generally Clotfelter, supra 
note 6. 
 292. While current research sometimes suggests a causal connection, at other times only a 
correlation can be shown. Let‘s assume, however, for purposes of our thought experiment, that 
causation could actually be shown with respect to the attributes discussed below. 
 293. ARTHUR C. BROOKS, GROSS NATIONAL HAPPINESS: WHY HAPPINESS MATTERS FOR 
AMERICA—AND HOW WE CAN GET MORE OF IT 41–56 (2008); Ed Diener & David G. Myers, Who Is 
Happy?, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. 10, 16 (1995). More specifically, people who actively practice a religion, 
whether by attending services or praying on their own, tend to be happier. BROOKS, supra, at 43–46. 
This holds true regardless of the religion practiced, and does not vary with age, sex, or education. 
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new proposition, these subsidies often draw heavy criticism.
294
 Applying a 
happiness-variant of utilitarianism, therefore, helps us assess one of the 
most common criticisms of the current charitable tax subsidies. 
Another implication is that happiness-based utilitarianism might call 
for an emphasis on groups that enhance friendships and relationships and 
encourage hobbies. A number of studies have suggested that people with 
several close relationships are happier than those without such ties and that 
a lack of such ties increases depression.
295
 Moreover, another contributor 
to happiness is active participation in hands-on meaningful activities that 
absorb one‘s attention.296 One rough rule of thumb, therefore, would be to 
subsidize more heavily non-profits that enable people with similar hobbies 
and interests to engage in those activities together in a shared community 
setting.
297
 While many such groups already qualify for tax exemption, not 
all (such as country clubs and participatory sports leagues) qualify for tax-
deductible contributions.
298
 Thus, applying a utilitarian analysis in this 
context might expand the set of organizations eligible to receive deductible 
contributions. Moreover, this suggests that non-profits providing non-
participatory goods and services (such as the opera) would not be 
subsidized as much as other organizations, but for reasons other than those 
articulated by past scholars. (This is not to say that watching an opera does 
not bring one happiness, just that so doing might not maximize the bang 
for one‘s happiness buck). 
B. The Maximin Principle 
A second welfarist approach to distributive justice commonly invoked 
by tax theorists is the maximin criterion, under which a just system of 
distribution maximizes the well-being of the least-advantaged.
299
 Such an 
 
 
Although current research has found a correlation between religion and happiness, whether the former 
causes the latter is still unclear. For purposes of our thought experiment, however, suppose that future 
happiness research does find causation. What would that suggest subsidizing? 
 294. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 52, at 1434–43. 
 295. BROOKS, supra note 293, at 73–74; Diener & Myers, supra note 293, at 14. To some extent, 
this is circular—happier people are also more likely to make friends in the first instance than unhappy 
people. That said, evidence does suggest a causal link between friendship and happiness and that 
additional friends increase happiness. BROOKS, supra note 293, at 73–74. 
 296. Diener & Myers, supra note 293, at 15. 
 297. One difficulty, of course, would be creating a definition that differentiates between groups 
formed by people who are already friends (yet create a non-profit just to have their activities 
subsidized) and between non-self-serving organizations that are trying to strengthen old or foster new 
friendships among third parties. 
 298. See HOPKINS, supra note 257, at 433–36. 
 299. See, e.g., Bankman & Griffith, supra note 1, at 1949–50; Zelenak & Moreland, supra note 1, 
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approach would likely result in a narrower deduction than under a pure 
utilitarian model and clear up a recurring confusion in current law: it 
suggests that groups that assisted the middle class would not merit a 
deduction, but that groups assisting the least-advantaged would.
300
  
One wrinkle in this approach is that it would require determining how 
to treat organizations that benefit the least-advantaged and the already-
advantaged simultaneously. For example, many private universities 
primarily cater to the wealthy, but do provide some help to the least-
advantaged in the form of scholarships, community outreach programs, 
and even employment opportunities. It is likely that a subsidy is still 
warranted because of the great marginal benefit to those who do need such 
assistance. A Harvard education will have a much greater impact on a poor 
student from rural Kentucky or inner-city Baltimore than a fourth-
generation Harvard graduate. Thus, the small marginal benefit to those 
already privileged may be justified by the much larger marginal benefit to 
the less-privileged, along the lines of Rawls‘s difference principle.301 Such 
groups, therefore, should merit at least a partial subsidy. What would 
differ from current law, however, is the insistence that such groups should 
engage in a substantial amount of assistance to the needy.  
 
 
at 53. Many tax scholars associate this criterion with Rawls‘s difference principle, which tolerates 
social and economic inequalities only if they benefit the least-advantaged. See, e.g., MURPHY & 
NAGEL, supra note 150, at 134; HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 266 (8th ed. 
2008); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 102 (3d ed. 2000); Bankman & 
Griffith, supra note 1, at 1949–50; Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on 
Taxation: What Rawls Demands from Tax Systems, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1991, 1993 n.9, 1994 
(2004); Zelenak & Moreland, supra note 1, at 53. Although the difference principle itself is complex 
and subject to a variety of interpretations, see David Kamin, Note, What is a Progressive Tax Change? 
Unmasking Hidden Values in Distributional Debates, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 241, 269–70 n.70 (2008), 
Rawls himself has not only endorsed the maximin criterion as one reasonable understanding of the 
difference principle but also allowed that its application to tax theory is reasonable. John Rawls, 
Concepts of Distributional Equity: Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 141 
(1974).  
 300. While the above discussion uses financial resources as a measure of advantage, it is quite 
likely that a maximin principle that used other metrics to measure advantage would yield an entirely 
different set of subsidies. For example, as discussed supra, in Part III.D, the propriety of assisting 
financially well-off victims of disasters has been questioned. If, however, one turns to other metrics of 
well-being, it seems quite plausible to consider families fleeing Hurricane Katrina or reeling from the 
death of a loved one after the September 11 attacks (to name but two examples) as among our 
country‘s least-advantaged. Similarly, it may be the case that the unhealthy should be considered 
disadvantaged, regardless of their income or wealth. Again, we see that a more nuanced consideration 
of distributive justice might help us better assess common criticisms of the charitable tax subsidies.  
 301. See Fleischer, supra note 30, at 303–07. 
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C. The Capability Approach 
A third consequentialist concept is the capability approach championed 
by Sen and Nussbaum. Under this model, society‘s duty is to ensure that 
each individual enjoys a minimal level of certain basic capabilities.
302
 
These basic capabilities include: 
 ―Life‖ (―being able to live to the end of a human life of normal 
length‖)  
 ―Bodily Health‖ (having good health, including adequate 
nourishment and adequate shelter)  
 ―Bodily Integrity‖ (freedom of movement, security from assault 
and violence, sexual choice and opportunity)  
 ―Senses, Imagination, and Thought‖ (using the senses to think, 
imagine, reason, and create, and having the education necessary 
to do so)  
 ―Emotions‖ (having ―attachments to things and people‖ and 
being able to love and experience other emotions)  
 ―Practical Reason‖ (―[b]eing able to form a conception of the 
good‖)  
 ―Affiliation‖ (―[b]eing able to live with and toward others . . . 
[and] engage in . . . social interaction‖ as well as being treated as 
an equal of dignified worth)  
 ―Other Species‖ (concern for other species and the environment) 
 ―Play‖ (―[b]eing able to laugh, [] play, [and] enjoy recreational 
activities‖)  
 ―Control Over One‘s Environment‖ (participating in political 
choices as well as opportunities to hold property and 
employment).
303
  
In contrast to the maximin approach, the capabilities approach would 
likely counsel a fairly broad conception of charity. As an initial matter, 
since this approach focuses on minimum thresholds of capabilities (instead 
 
 
 302. Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, 
2003 FEMINIST ECON. 33, 40–41 (2003).  
 303. Id. at 41–42. 
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of equality of capabilities or redistribution for utilitarian principles), the 
deduction would generally not be limited to organizations benefiting only 
the poor and disadvantaged. Take, for example, the opera or an art 
museum. As long as the organization provides some access to those who 
otherwise would not have the ability to enjoy its benefits, it furthers the 
development of a threshold level of capabilities. That it may also benefit 
those who might be able to develop their imaginations and senses without 
a subsidy generally should not matter, for this approach does not seem to 
be relational: Person A‘s capacity to enjoy art does not appear to affect 
Person B‘s capacity to enjoy art.304 Thus, the fact that wealthy people may 
primarily benefit from groups like the opera does not generally detract 
from the fact that—so long as the opera made itself available to poorer 
persons via reduced prices or a similar manner—the opera also enhances 
the capabilities of the less advantaged.  
The capabilities approach also supports subsidizing a wide range of 
activities. For example, the capability of ―play‖ suggests subsidizing not 
only groups like the YMCA but also sports leagues, tennis clinics, and the 
like. And the capability of ―senses, imagination, and thought‖ suggests 
subsidizing the arts, literature, music, dance, and so on—both to 
participate in and to enjoy vicariously. The capabilities approach may thus 
suggest a deduction very similar to the current one. To that end, explicitly 
recognizing this approach to distributive justice helps answer many of the 
current criticisms leveled against the charitable tax subsidies. So doing 
would, however, change current law in one important respect by requiring 
subsidized organizations somehow to assist people who would otherwise 
be unable to develop their capabilities. On the other hand, due to the 
breadth of the capabilities approach, using it to define charity, standing 
alone, may not help us allocate scarce resources. 
D. Egalitarianism and Equality of Opportunity 
The notion of equality of opportunity
305
 plays a large role in many tax 
policy debates, providing one of the most common justifications for the 
 
 
 304. The one exception might be education, where relative levels of education do affect other 
capabilities. For example, even if Person A has a threshold level of education, she may still be at a 
disadvantage in competing for jobs and the like (control over one‘s environment) if Person B has a 
clearly superior education. This raises the question of whether elite schools like Harvard and Yale, 
which primarily (but not exclusively) benefit individuals who could develop their capabilities without 
societal assistance, should merit a subsidy. 
 305. Most lay people think of ―equal opportunity‖ as requiring that one‘s talents and abilities 
should determine one‘s chances for success in life. Individual outcomes may diverge over time, but 
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estate tax and other forms of redistribution. As explored below, various 
strands of egalitarianism have very different implications for the charitable 
tax subsidies.
306
  
1. Equality of Resources 
This version of equality (which would equalize financial resources, so 
that a smart but poor child could become a successful businesswoman, 
doctor, or lawyer) would suggest granting a deduction for charities that 
enable less well-off individuals to develop their innate skills as much as 
their wealthier counterparts. At first, this appears to have few implications: 
of course, we think, groups that provide training and education that enable 
the poor to develop their skills enough to compete in the marketplace 
(such as job-training programs and tutoring sessions in low-income areas) 
should be subsidized.  
But the implications might not be so clear cut. For example, what about 
organizations that simply provide material benefits to the poor, such as 
soup kitchens, low-income health clinics, and the like, without any 
―training‖ component? Should these be subsidized on the grounds that a 
poor child cannot learn to read if she is too hungry to learn? After all, poor 
adults may have a hard time finding jobs to support themselves without 
adequate food, clothing, and so on. Or, might one argue that simply 
―giving someone a fish‖ does not help them develop their talents, and that 
only ―teaching someone to fish‖ creates equality of resources over time? 
And what about organizations that enable the poor or middle class to 
develop other, less-marketable skills, in the same manner as their better-
off peers. For example, what about music camps for the non-wealthy? Is 
helping a talented pianist who otherwise could not afford a pricey music 
camp become a better musician—even if it has no impact on her financial 
well-being—what we have in mind when we speak of ensuring that 
everyone has an equal chance to develop their talents? In other words, 
 
 
that divergence should not be due to the financial circumstances of one‘s birth. Rather, divergent 
outcomes should be due to differing initial endowments or differing choices with respect to the use of 
initial endowments. As many readers already know, however, there are several different interpretations 
of what is required to implement that ideal: only the absence of legal impediments to success based on 
race or class (―careers open to talents‖), or the equalization of initial resources (―equality of 
resources‖)? If the latter, what should be equalized? Financial resources? Capabilities? Welfare? 
 306. For insightful analyses of the various strands of equality of opportunity, see KYMLICKA, 
supra note 150, at 53–101; ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 43–148, 149 (1991); Alstott, supra note 
3, at 476–85; David G. Duff, Taxing Inherited Wealth: A Philosophical Argument, 6 CAN. J.L. & 
JURIS. 3, 45–57 (1993). In this short preview, I only address two such strands, although the second part 
of this Series will also address ―careers open to talents‖ and ―equality of capabilities.‖  
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should we treat all talents equally? Lastly, what about charities that help 
both the advantaged and disadvantaged develop their skills? (As discussed 
with respect to the maximin theory, it is likely that such groups should be 
subsidized only if they do, in fact, aid the disadvantaged, and even then, 
only partially.) Regardless, we can see that focusing on equality of 
resources may change the contours of the charitable tax subsidies.  
2. Equality of Opportunity for Welfare 
In contrast, a deduction structured around equality of opportunity for 
welfare (which equalizes tastes, on the theory that someone with 
expensive tastes is at a relative disadvantage vis-à-vis individuals with 
cheaper tastes)
307
 would likely be fairly broad, much like the current 
subsidies. Under this conception of equality, those with expensive tastes 
(wine, leisure, and the like) should be compensated, which suggests 
subsidizing groups such as Harvard, the opera, and the ballet without 
regard to the financial status of the charity‘s clientele: under this view, 
someone who enjoys the opera (regardless of their income level) is worse 
off than someone of the same income level who is satisfied with American 
Idol, and her tastes should therefore be subsidized. Explicitly identifying 
this conception of equality could also help resolve the give-a-fish-teach-to-
fish debate, for this theory suggests that those with a stronger taste for 
leisure are worse off than hard workers. Under this conception of equality, 
therefore, simply giving someone a fish should be considered charitable. 
Here again, we see that making explicit the normative underpinnings of 
the charitable tax subsidies might help us answer critics of the subsidies.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Analysis of distributive justice should play a role in theorizing the 
charitable tax subsidies. So doing extends the work of the efficiency and 
pluralism scholarship by recognizing that the charitable tax subsidies have 
redistributive consequences that must be addressed. Making distributive 
justice concerns explicit also helps us better analyze whether the content 
of the subsidies should be defined more precisely in order to further the 
implicit normative values motivating the current focus on efficiency and 
pluralism. As can be seen, alternative conceptions of distributive justice 
have very different consequences for the content of the subsidies. It is 
precisely this diversity of implications that should animate us to think 
 
 
 307. RAKOWSKI, supra note 306, at 44–45.  
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more carefully about what distributive justice—alongside the values of 
efficiency and pluralism—adds to our understanding of the charitable tax 
subsidies. 
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